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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Motivations 
This research is aimed at studying the role of trade as international 
transmission mechanism of shocks. The study focuses on trade flows in the 
last decade as channels of transmission of currency shocks across the 
Central Eastern European “new” European Union (EU) members.  
 
The poor understanding of the transmission of financial and currency crises 
in past years has prompted in the economic literature a surge of interest in 
international transmission mechanisms of shocks. Through a careful survey 
of the literature it is possible to draw some interesting findings on 
international transmission channels.  
 
One important finding is that in most cases countries are highly 
“interdependent” in all states of the world. Therefore, the strong cross-
country linkages that exist during a crisis are not significantly different than 
those prevailing during stable period. Moreover, the results of many 
empirical studies provided trade flows, among the other cross-country 
linkages, with a very important role in transmitting shocks internationally. 
 
The choice of Central Eastern European countries (CEECs) as case study 
depends on several motivations. First CEECs are the main actors in the 
process of the EU enlargement. In the completion of the enlargement 
process the CEECs are going to join the ERM II and eventually the EMU, 
abandoning the possibility to use exchange rate as effective instrument for 
absorbing shocks.  
 
The entry of the new Member States into EU prompted a broad debate on 
the choice of the optimal exchange rate strategy towards the ERM II and the 
euro. Therefore, at present the assessment of the potential sustainability of 
ERM II and the study of potential causes of CEECs vulnerability to 
currency shocks seem to be of particular interest from an economic policy 
point of view.  
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Second, the CEECs are very suitable for representing the Periphery of EU. 
They are a group of geographically close countries, they have a high degree 
of trade integration with EU and some intra periphery trade exists. Studying 
these countries as case study for the issue of international transmission of 
shocks within a Centre-Periphery model of devaluations seems to be 
appropriate. Furthermore, the study of an empirical case in the framework of 
a theoretical model allows to bridge the gap between theoretical and 
empirical analysis which is the main shortcoming in the existing literature. 
 
Third the CEECs’ financial markets and banking sector are not yet fully -
developed and integrated providing trade linkages with a major role in 
transmitting shocks. Therefore these countries represent a case study 
suitable for analysing the transmission of currency shocks via trade 
linkages. 
 
 
1.2 Structure of research 
The research is divided in three chapters. The first chapter presents a survey 
of the existing literature on international transmission of financial and 
currency shocks with a focus on contagion. The second chapter is an 
assessment of the role of trade in the transmission of currency shocks across 
geographically close countries focusing on the case of CEE acceding 
countries, and the third chapter provides an estimate of the effects of EU 
eastwards enlargement process on trade patterns in the Enlarged EU.  
 
In particular, the first chapter focuses on the recent debate concerning the 
definition of contagion. In literature there is not a uniform definition of what 
contagion constitutes. The idea that financial and currency crises cause 
structural breaks in international transmission mechanisms is opposed to the 
one that transmission mechanisms are the same during crises and during 
stable period.  
 
According to recent econometric findings the increases in correlation 
coefficients of stocks, interest and exchange rates -which are qualified as 
contagion- are due only to the excess of volatility in the markets that is 
reflected in a bias upward in the results of the most common econometric 
tests. Therefore there was virtually no contagion during most of crises’ 
episodes proving that countries are highly “interdependent” in all states of 
the world. 
 
Studies by Forbes (2001), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), Caramazza et al. 
(1999), Glick and Rose (1998), Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) 
provided evidence supporting the hypothesis that currency crises spread 
from one country to another because of trade linkages. They also show that 
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explanations of the international transmission of currency shocks based on 
trade links across countries perform empirically better than explanations 
based on similarities in the macroeconomic characteristics of the economies 
concerned. 
 
The relevance of trade has been considered mainly in empirical analysis 
characterised by few linkages with theoretical tools. Most of the above-
mentioned empirical studies identify and measure trade links by means of 
total export shares either bilateral or in common markets. Theoretical papers 
studying competitive devaluation in a Centre Periphery (C-P) framework 
suggest that further progress in the empirical testing of the relevance of 
trade as transmission channel can be achieved through deeper analysis of 
trade structure and firms pricing behaviour.  
 
Therefore, the object of the second part of this research is to assess the role 
of trade flows and trade structure in the transmission of currency shocks 
across geographically close countries. I interpret the interactions that a C-P 
model identifies for Periphery countries as a possible description of 
interdependencies existing among CEECs. The analysis focus on identifying 
and comparing the degree of vulnerability to currency shocks of CEECs. 
 
The second part of the research points out that in a C-P framework (i.e. the 
enlarged EU) the patterns of trade flows, next to trade structure and exporter 
firms pricing policies, have a very important role in determining 
vulnerability to currency shocks. 
 
The object of the third and last part of the research is to estimate the effect 
of EU eastwards enlargement process on trade patterns in the Enlarged 
Union. In particular, it investigates whether and how the European (Free 
Trade) Agreements (EAs) with CEECs have exerted a different impact on 
centre-periphery and intra-periphery trade relationships. This last part also 
evaluated if the “EU membership factor” has had anticipated additional 
positive effects for CEECs exports. 
 
 
1.3 What is new in this research work 
This work, next to a careful review of the existing literature, attempts to 
make the following contributions: (i) it aims to bridge the gap between the 
theory and the empirics of transmission of currency shocks via trade 
linkages; (ii) it intends to explicitly take into consideration trade structure 
and firms’ pricing behaviour and their effects on transmission of currency 
shocks (iii) it focuses on CEECs to derive policy implications on the 
sustainability and opportunity of the announced strategies towards the ERM 
II and the EMU. iv) it provides estimates of a gravity equation for CEECs’ 
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trade flows using a “System GMM” dynamic panel data approach. The latter 
is a quite new estimate methodology allowing for the introduction of 
dynamics in panel data analysis. 
 
 
1.4 Main findings 
In the first chapter the analysis of the literature on international transmission 
of shocks pointed out several interesting issues: 
 
i) The exact definition (and causes) of contagion are not known neither are 
the precise policy interventions that can most effectively reduce contagion 
and moreover according to different definitions, theories, empirical tests 
results and policy implications change. 
 
ii) the still unresolved dispute concerning shift contagion versus 
interdependence is reflected in the division of the literature in two blocks: 
crisis contingent (shift contagion) theories and non crisis contingent 
(interdependence) theories. Next to the broad theoretical literature the 
extensive empirical literature could be generated by the attempt to give a 
solution at the shift contagion versus interdependence puzzle. 
 
iii) in the empirical literature each of the papers that attempts to correct for 
heteroscedasticity, endogeneity and/or omitted variables shows that the bias 
from these problems affects estimates of contagion during financial crises 
episodes. These papers use a variety of different approaches, identification 
assumptions, and model specifications to adjust for one (or more) of these 
problems. They find that transmission mechanisms were fairly stable during 
crises. Since contagion is defined as a significant increase in cross-market 
linkages after a shock, this suggests that little contagion occurred during 
recent crises. 
 
The second chapter shows that a theoretical framework provides suggestions 
on how to implement the empirical analysis of currency disturbances 
transmission via trade linkages. In particular, a centre–periphery scheme is 
used to analyse the potential vulnerability to currency shocks of CEECs in 
the framework of the EU enlargement process. 
 
The results of the analysis points out that (other things being equal and 
given the contained intra periphery trade) the transmission of currency 
disturbances is lower if the disturbance origins in countries with low pass-
through (Slovak and Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia), and higher if 
origins in countries with high pass-through (Poland, Hungary and Slovenia). 
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What emerges in the second chapter is that due to pass-through and trade 
structures heterogeneity, it is very difficult to derive for CEECs a unitary 
policy implication on ERM II potential sustainability. However seems to be 
possible to single out for which country pairs the incentive to transmit 
currency shocks is higher. 
 
From the analysis emerges very clearly the important role of the direction of 
trade flows in a Centre-Periphery framework to explain the degree of 
vulnerability of countries to currency shocks. “According to the Centre-
Periphery model if there is no pass-through, then direct bilateral trade links 
may play a more important role than competition in the third market in 
determining the transmission of exchange rate shocks in the periphery. If 
there is full pass-through, a high share of bilateral trade within a region 
can actually limit the extent of beggar-thy neighbour effects” (Corsetti et al. 
1998b). 
 
These findings underline the importance to investigate the effect of EU 
eastwards enlargement process on trade patterns in the enlarged EU. In 
particular, the third chapter shows that the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
signed by CEECs have exerted a different impact on centre-periphery and 
intra-periphery trade relationships. 
 
Being part of a FTA with EU15 countries (Eas) increased CEECs bilateral 
trade by more than 11%; intra-periphery agreements increased trade around 
14.% on average. The relatively lower impact on export flows of EAs than 
intra periphery FTA could be explained by the fact that, starting from the 
end of the eighties, trade between CEECs and EU 15 was already intense 
because reduction of trade barriers have already taken place. 
 
It is worth to notice that estimates results seem to support the evidence 
coming from the data (see paragraph II). Starting from a very low level, the 
rate of growth of intra-periphery trade has been higher than core-periphery 
trade, ceteris paribus, because of an higher FTA impact. From this 
perspective, trade agreements between centre and periphery did not hamper 
trade relationship among periphery countries (no “hub and spoke” effect). 
 
For what concern the “EU membership factor”, estimate results suggest that 
the trade flows coming from CEECs “embodied” in some cases the news of 
the future EU membership.  
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Chapter I 
 
 
“Contagion: A disease that can be 
communicated rapidly through direct 
or indirect contact”.  
 
(Webster Dictionary) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shift contagion or interdependence? An analysis of financial 
and currency crises’ main transmission channels. 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is aimed at surveying and analysing the literature on 
international transmission of shocks. It focuses on the recent debate on 
financial contagion which compares the hypotheses of interdependence and 
shift contagion. 
 
In the last years during financial and currency turbulences initial country-
specific shocks were rapidly transmitted to markets of very different sizes 
and structures. In crisis periods the cross market correlation seems to 
increase with respect to the one of more stable period.  
 
The significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock, the so-called 
contagion, imposed the problem to study if international transmission 
mechanisms of financial and currency shocks are the same during crisis and 
stable periods.  
 
It is worth to notice that there is not yet in literature a uniform definition of 
what contagion constitutes. To the idea that during crises transmission 
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mechanisms change (shift contagion), is opposed the one that cross market 
linkages are the same that exist during more stable periods 
(interdependence). 
 
If the econometric tests verify the shift contagion hypothesis it could have 
important repercussions on international investors and policy makers 
behaviour. First, if contagion occurs after a negative shock it would 
undermine much of the rationale for international diversification. Second, 
international institutions and policy makers worry that a negative shock to 
one country can have a negative impact on financial flows to another 
country—even if the fundamentals of the second economy are strong and 
there is little real connection between the two countries. This effect could 
lead to a financial or currency crisis, completely unwarranted by the 
country's fundamentals and policies, in the second country. If this sort of 
contagion exists, it could justify international organization intervention and 
the dedication of massive amounts of resource to stabilization funds.  
 
The chapter is divided in four parts: The first part provides an overview of 
definitions and misconceptions concerning financial contagion, the second 
surveys the theory and empirics of contagion. In the third part empirical 
tests and econometric issues are examined, concluding remarks are 
presented in the last section. 
 
 
I.1 Contagion: definitions 
Since the Asian crisis in 1997 the term contagion has been referred to the 
spread of financial turmoil across countries. Among economists there is 
little agreement on what exactly the term contagion entails. The exam of the 
literature provides three prevailing definitions:1: 
 
i) Fundamental base contagion (interdependence): the contagion is the 
transmission of global or local shocks across countries through 
fundamentals (spillover effects). According to this definition contagion 
could arise also during stable periods, Calvo e Reinhart (1996), Pristker 
(2000));  
 
ii) Excess of co-movements: the contagion is the transmission of global 
or local shocks across countries through mechanisms that not include 
fundamentals. This type of contagion is considered to be caused by 
                                                          
1
 Pericoli and Sbracia (2001) include five different definitions, the two missed in this 
paragraph are i) “contagion is a significant increase in the probability of a crisis in one 
country conditional on a crisis occurring in another country”  and ii) “contagion occurs 
when volatility spills over from the crisis country to the financial markets of other 
countries”. 
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“irrational” phenomena, such as financial panic, herd behaviour, increase in 
risk aversion or a loss of confidence (Claessens, Dornbusch, Park (2001), 
Jeanne and Masson (1998)). 
 
iii) shift contagion: the contagion is a significant change in cross-market 
linkages after a shock to an individual country (or group of countries). 
(Forbes and Rigobon (1998)).  
 
The transmission mechanisms underling the three definitions could be 
represented by the following model, partly taken from Forbes and Rigobon 
(1999), Pristker (2001) and Pericoli and Sbracia (2001): 
 
xi,t= αi + βiXt + γiat +εi,t 
 
where:  
 
xi,t is the stock price in country i at time t,  
Xt is the vector of stocks prices xj,t in countries different from i (j ≠ i),  
at is a common aggregate shock linked to fundamentals, and  
εi,t is an idiosyncratic and independent shock. 
 
On the basis of this equation, it is possible to show how transmission 
mechanisms work according to the three different definitions of contagion: 
 
i) the first transmission mechanism of aggregated or specific shocks is 
measured by at and Xt, and the direct effect of these shocks on each country 
i is embodied respectively by γi. and βi. 
 
ii) the second transmission mechanism is measured by the correlation of 
idiosyncratic shocks of different countries εi,t, it is interpreted as contagion 
because there is excess of co-movements that cannot be explained by 
fundamentals; 
 
iii) the third transmission mechanism is measured by a shift in cross-
market linkages and therefore is embodied in changes in both parameters βi 
and γi (i.e. structural break). 
 
The first definition, as noticed by Claessens, Dornbusch and Park (2001), 
should not be properly considered as contagion. Therefore, it reflects the 
interdependence that exists in each state of the world among countries. 
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According to the interdependence definition, global or local shocks are 
transmitted internationally by financial or real channels2. 
 
The second definition, as noticed in Pritsker (2001)3, presents two orders of 
problems: The first is that the finding of contagion can always be questioned 
on the basis that the correct set of fundamentals was not controlled for (i.e. 
omitted variables problem). The second is related to the possibility that 
contagion occurs through a channel that Kodres e Pritsker (2000) refer to as 
“cross market hedging”.  
 
In the cross market hedging models some operators receive information 
(information shock) about country-specific components. After the shock the 
informed operators will optimally alter their portfolio for the country where 
the shock occurred. But they will also hedge the change in their 
macroeconomic risk exposures by rebalancing in other countries. The 
rebalancing transmits the idiosyncratic shock across markets, generating 
correlation in short-run stock returns. 
 
The third definition “not only clarifies that contagion arises from a shift in 
cross market linkages, but it also avoids taking a stance on how this shift 
occurs”. As explained in Forbes and Rigobon (1999), the adoption of the 
shift contagion definition provides three types of advantages: 
 
i) First, the test for shift contagion is a test of the effectiveness of 
international diversification in reducing the portfolio risk during a crisis. In 
fact, if shift contagion occurs after a negative shock it would undermine 
much of the rationale for international diversification.  
 
ii) Second, the definition is useful in evaluating the role and potential 
effectiveness of international institution and bailout funds.  
 
iii) Third, tests based on this definition provide a useful method to 
classify theories as those that entail either a change in propagation 
mechanisms after a shock (crisis-contingent theories) versus those which are 
a continuation of existing mechanisms (non crisis contingent theories). 
 
 
                                                          
2
 The others two categories occur when the transmission of a crisis cannot be linked to 
observed changes in fundamentals and result solely from the behavior of investors or other 
financial agents 
3
 “I prefer a broad definition because the economics profession will probably never reach 
agreement on the appropriate set of fundamentals which are needed to make a narrow 
definition operational” 
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I.2 Theoretical and empirical literature 
 
I.2.1. Shift contagion or “crisis-contingent” theories: Are those that 
explain why transmission mechanisms change during a crisis and therefore 
why cross-market linkages increase after a shock. They can be divided into 
three kind of models: i) multiple equilibria; ii) endogenous liquidity; iii) 
political contagion. 
 
i) Multiple equilibria: This kind of models explains contagion as result of 
self fulfilling shifts in expectations.  
 
Masson (1998) shows how a crisis in one country could coordinate 
investors’ expectations, shifting them from good to a bad equilibrium for 
another economy and thereby spreading the crisis in the second economy. 
Mullainathan (1998) argues that investors imperfectly recall past events. A 
crisis in one country could trigger a memory of past crises, which cause 
investors to recomputed their priors and assign higher probability to a bad 
state. The resulting downward co-movement in prices would occur because 
memories and not fundamentals are correlated. 
 
In both of these models – Masson and Mullainathan- the shift from a good 
to a bad equilibrium, and the transmission of the shock are due to a change 
in investors’ beliefs and not to any real linkages. This kind of models was 
used to explain speculative attacks in countries with solid macroeconomic 
fundamentals (Radelet and Sachs 1998, Sachs, Tornell and Velasco 1996). 
However it is extremely difficult to test the assumptions of these models. 
 
ii) Endogenous liquidity: These models explain contagion through the 
presence of liquidity constraints. During the Asian crisis the devaluation and 
the crash of the stock markets in Thailand caused strong losses in the capital 
account of many international investors. This losses could have given the 
incentive to international investors to sell assets in other emerging markets 
not in crisis to gather liquidity. 
 
Valdés (1996) develops a model where a crisis in one country can reduce 
the liquidity of market participants. This could force investors to recompose 
their portfolios and sell assets in other countries in order to continue 
operating in the market, to satisfy margin calls or to meet regulatory 
requirements. Therefore, if the liquidity shock is large enough, a crisis in 
one country could increase the degree of credit rationing and force investors 
to sell their assets in countries not affected by the initial crisis.  
 
Calvo (1999) develops a different model of endogenous liquidity. In his 
model, there is asymmetric information among investors. Informed 
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investors received signals about fundamentals of a country and are hit by 
liquidity shocks (margin calls) that force them to sell their assets. 
 
Uninformed investors cannot distinguish between liquidity shocks and a bad 
signal, and therefore charge a premium where the informed investors are net 
sellers. This transmission mechanisms does not occurs during stable periods 
and only occurs after the initial shocks. In both models the liquidity shock 
causes an increase in the cross market correlation unexplained by 
fundamentals4. 
 
Two important implications of these models based on liquidity constraints 
are that i) the more country assets are traded on financial markets the more 
is the likelihood of contagion in this country. (Calvo and Mendoza (1998), 
Kodres and Pritsker (1998)). ii) Countries which assets have high degree of 
correlation with country hit by a crisis are more vulnerable to contagion 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998), Allen and Gale (1998)). 
 
iii) Political contagion5: this kind of models was not exclusively used to 
explain contagion in emerging markets, but also in mature markets. Drazen 
(1998) studies the European devaluations of 1992 and 1993 and develops a 
model assuming that central bank presidents are under political pressure to 
maintain their countries’ fixed exchange rates. When one country decides to 
abandon its peg, this reduces the political costs to other countries of 
abandoning their respective pegs, which increases the likelihood of 
switching exchange rate regimes. As a result, exchange rate crises may be 
bunched together, and once again, transmission of the initial shock occurs 
through a mechanisms that did not exist before the initial crisis6. 
 
I.2.2.Interdependence or “non-crisis-contingent” theories: These theories 
assume that transmission mechanism after an initial shock are not 
significantly different than before the crisis. They can be divided into three 
kind of models: i) Trade and competitive devaluation, ii) Asymmetric 
information and policy co-ordination, iii) Random aggregate shocks. 
 
i) Trade and competitive devaluation: These kind of models explains the 
transmission of financial and currency shocks through trade channel. When 
a crisis determines a large devaluation in one country, all main trading 
                                                          
4
 Kodres e Pritsker (1999) present a model similar to the Calvo’s one. In the model there 
are four cathegories of agents: i) informed investors, ii) uninformed investors, iii) liquidity 
traders, iv) noise traders. 
5
 Claessens, Dornbusch, Park (2001) include these models in the multiple equilibrium 
framework. See also Morris and Shin (1998) which show that some speculative attacks are 
due to events not linked to fundamentals. 
6
 See also Fratzscher (1999). 
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partners can suffer from a generalised downwards shift of asset prices, 
capital outflows or speculative attacks.  
 
This could happen because investors have the expectations that the exports 
towards the country hit by the crisis will decrease and thus will cause a 
worsening of the current account. A second channel is represented by 
competitive devaluations. A devaluation in a first victim country increases 
its competitiveness in third markets. This could put pressure on the 
currencies of main trading partners especially if they are under a fixed 
exchange rate regime. 
  
Gerlach and Smets (1996), Corsetti et al. (2000) show how trade channel 
after a shock has a twofold effect. If one country devalues its currency, this 
would have the direct effect of increasing the relative competitiveness of 
that country’s goods. Export to a second country could increase thereby 
hurting domestic sales within the second country. The initial devaluation 
could also have the indirect effect of reducing export sales from other 
countries that compete in the same third markets. Either of these effects 
could not only have a direct impact on a country’s sales and output, but if 
the loss in competitiveness is severe enough it could increase expectations 
of an exchange rate devaluation and/or lead to an attack on another 
country’s currency.7.  
 
ii) Asymmetric information and policy co-ordination8: This family of 
models has stressed the role of trade in financial assets in contagion, 
particularly in presence of information asymmetries and heterogeneous 
expectation. In the absence of perfect information a crisis in one country 
could make investors to believe that other nation with similar characteristics 
could receive a shock. A currency crisis for example could determine a 
speculative attack in other countries similar to the “first victim” country9.  
 
This behaviour can be either rational or irrational. If a crisis reveals weak 
fundamentals, investors may rationally conclude that countries with similar 
fundamentals could also face similar problems, thus causing contagion. This 
transmission channel assumes that investors are imperfectly informed about 
countries’ features. They plan their decisions on the basis of some known 
                                                          
7
 See Forbes (2001 a e b) and Forbes (2002) 
8
 In this kind of models could be considered also the Changes in the rules of game type. 
Accordino to this  kind of model contagion is due to a shift in the operators expectations on 
the international finance rules. (i.e IMF bail out policy). Calvo (1998, 1999) and Dornbusch 
(1998, 1999). 
9
 For example if a country with a weak banking system is discovered to be susceptible to a 
currency crisis, investors could revaluate the strength of the banking system in other 
countries and adjust their expected probabilities of a crisis accordingly. 
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indicators, including those revealed in other countries, which may or may 
not reflect the true state of countries’ vulnerability. 
 
Calvo (1999) and Calvo and Mendoza (1998) show that in the presence of 
informational asymmetries, fixed costs involved in gathering and processing 
country-specific information could lead to herd behaviour, even when 
investors are rational. The herd behaviour, according to these models could 
be “an outcome of optimal portfolio diversification that becomes more 
prevalent as securities markets grow”10.  
 
Chari and Kehoe (1999) and Calvo and Mendoza (2000) analyse the case in 
which investors apply what they “learn” during a crisis in a country to hedge 
the risks in countries with fundamentals similar to the ones of the first 
victim country. 
 
iii) Random aggregate shocks. This approach considers the possibility that 
global random shocks could hit simultaneously the fundamentals of many 
countries. For example a rise in the international interest rate, a contraction 
in the international supply of capital, or a decline in international demand 
could simultaneously slow growth in a number of countries. Asset prices in 
any countries affected by aggregate shock would move together, so that 
directly after the shock, cross-market correlation between countries could 
increase. 
 
Calvo and Reinhart (1996) and Chunhan et al. (1998) show how changes in 
US interest rates have been linked to movements in capital flows to Latin 
America. Corsetti et al. (1998a) and Radelet and Sachs (1998a e 1998b) 
show how the 1995-6 strengthening of the US dollar versus the yen has been 
identified as an important factor contributing to weakening exports of East 
Asian countries and their subsequent financial difficulties. In general, a 
common shock can lead to increased co-movements in asset prices and/or 
capital flows. 
 
 
I.3 Tests for contagion and main econometric problems 
 
I.3.1. Test for contagion 
The empirical literature testing contagion is even more extensive than the 
theoretical one. In general, in literature six different approaches have been 
utilised to measure the transmission of shocks and test for contagion11. The 
first three types of test, here after, try to verify the presence of structural 
                                                          
10
 Calvo and Mendoza (1998). 
11
 Pericoli and Sbracia (2001). 
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breaks in the correlation coefficient, the others try to measure how shocks 
spread across countries starting from a first victim country12.  
 
i) Unexplained correlation o cross-market correlation: according to this test 
there is contagion if there is cross-market correlation unexplained by 
fundamentals. The test of cross-market correlation measures the correlation 
in returns between two markets during a stable period and then tests for a 
significant increase in this correlation after a shock.  
 
Calvo and Reinhart (1995) use this approach to test for contagion after the 
1994 Mexican peso crisis and find that the correlation in stock prices and 
Brady bonds between Asian and Latin American emerging markets 
increased significantly.  
 
Baig and Goldfajn (1998) present the most thorough analysis using this 
framework and test for contagion in stock indices, currency prices, interest 
rates, and sovereign spreads in emerging markets during the 1997-8 East 
Asian crisis. They find that cross-market correlation increased during the 
crisis for many countries. 
 
Each of these tests based on cross-market correlation coefficients reaches 
the same general conclusion: correlation usually increases significantly after 
the relevant crisis and therefore contagion occurs. Some authors13, underline 
that a marked increase in correlations among different countries’ markets 
may however not be sufficient proof of contagion. In fact, the apparent 
increase in the cross market correlations pointed out in the tests during the 
crisis could be due to some econometric bias. 
 
ii) VAR models and cointegration analysis: These models focus on cross 
markets changes in long term relationships once a financial shock arises. 
 
                                                          
12
 It is worth noticing that even if the most of empirical literature uses macro economics 
data there are some empirical paper that use microeconomic data: Forbes and Rigobon 
(2001), Baig and Goldfajn (1998), Claessens, Dornbush and Park (2001), De Gregorio and 
Valdés (2001), Forbes (2001). These analyses based on macroeconomic data, however, 
ignore a tremendous wealth of information that is lost in the aggregation used to create the 
key variables. Within each country there is a large variation in how different companies are 
affected by financial crises. For example, if a devaluation in one country increases the 
competitiveness of its exports, firms in other countries should only be directly affected by 
the devaluation if they sell products which compete with those exports. Companies that 
produce non-traded goods should be less affected by the devaluation. Empirical studies that 
simply look at a country's aggregate trade statistics, balance of payments, or total market 
returns, will ignore these important differential effects across firms.  
13 Forbes and Rigobon (2000), Rigobon (2000), Rigobon (2001), Corsetti, Pericoli and 
Sbracia (2001), Pericoli and Sbracia (2001). 
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Forbes and Rigobon (1999) estimate a VAR model with daily returns of the 
stock market and short term interest rates of several industrial and emerging 
countries, with reference to three financial crisis (the Wall Street crash on 
October 1987, the Mexican crisis in 1994-95 and the Asian crisis in October 
1997). When correlation coefficients are adjusted for the increased 
volatility, the hypothesis of correlation breakdown is rejected in most of the 
cases. In fact, they argue that the increase in correlation observable after a 
shock in one country is simply due to the interdependence among stock 
markets and not to a change in linkages. Similarly, Rigobon (1999) builds 
an instrumental variable estimator for testing the correlation breakdown 
hypothesis relative to 36 stock markets of industrial and emerging countries 
during the same crisis episodes, showing that, unlike traditional analyses, 
the hypothesis is almost always rejected14. 
 
iii) Markov switching models: In the last years, a different kind of empirical 
analysis has been developed to test discontinuities in the data-generating 
process, which is based on the Markov switching model developed by 
Hamilton (1994) and others.20 This framework has the advantage that 
discontinuities can be directly attributed to jumps between multiple 
equilibria. 
 
Jeanne (1997) considers a second generation model of currency crisis in 
which, for a given range of fundamentals, multiple equilibria arise and 
determine three different probabilities of a devaluation. In his setting, jumps 
between multiple equilibria correspond to jumps between the probabilities 
of a devaluation. Similarly to the classical models illustrated in the 
theoretical section, once fundamentals enter a multiple equilibria zone, 
jumps can occur as a result of a sunspot, without any further change in the 
economy. Moreover, such a sunspot can be represented by a 3X3 Markov 
transition matrix, which defines the probability that the economy will jump 
from one given probability of a devaluation to another15. 
 
Jeanne and Masson (1998) extend both the empirical and the theoretical 
framework, by including non-linearities and the possibility of chaotic 
dynamics. In particular, they estimate a model where fundamentals also 
include a time trend, intended to capture reputation effects that, as suggested 
by Masson (1995), should grow gradually as a result of Bayesian learning of 
speculators. In this model, the sunspot is represented as a 2X2 Markov 
transition matrix. Their estimates, performed over a longer horizon 
                                                          
14Forbes and Rigobon (1998) reject the structural break hypothesis for all the countries 
during the firsts two crises. For the Asian crisis they find an excess of co-movements due to 
the shock originated in Thailand only for the case of Hong Kong and Italy. 
15 Jeanne applies the model to the exchange rate of the French franc with the German mark 
from January 1991 to July 1993. 
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(February 1987 - July 1993), yield essentially the same results as Jeanne 
(1997). 
 
Fratzscher (1999) built a model in which the exchange rate pressure in one 
country depends on a set of fundamentals of this country, some measures of 
its real integration (trade linkages) and of financial integration with other 
countries, and the possibility of regime-switching. He estimates both a 2-
regime and a 3-regime Markov switching model on data from 25 emerging 
countries from 1986 to 1998. Interestingly, he finds that, although Markov 
switching models without real and financial integration perform well for 
most countries, any regime-switching is eliminated when integration is 
included in the analysis. In particular, the model indicates that the 
transmission of shocks (from both real and financial channels) plays a major 
role in determining exchange rate pressure both in tranquil times and during 
crisis periods. Fratzscher (1999) also uses his estimates in order to obtain, 
for any country, a prediction of the severity of the exchange rate pressure 
during the Mexican and the Asian crisis and a rank of the vulnerability of 
countries for both episodes.  
 
iv) ARCH and GARCH models: Empirical studies of the transmission of 
shocks across financial markets with generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedastic (GARCH) models have been proposed by Hamao (1990), 
who analysed the transmission of volatility after the stock market crash of 
October 1987. The authors find evidence of volatility spillover effects from 
the US and UK stock markets to the Japanese market. Interestingly, while 
these effects are statistically significant, spillovers in other directions after 
1987 or in any direction before 1987 are much weaker. 
 
Chou et al. (1994), use this procedure and find evidence of significant 
spillover across markets after the 1987 U.S. stock market crash. They also 
conclude that contagion does not occur evenly across countries and is fairly 
stable through time. 
 
Edwards (1998) examines the propagation across bond markets after the 
Mexican peso crisis by focusing on how capital control affect the 
transmission of shocks. He estimates an augmented GARCH model and 
shows that there were significant spillovers from Mexico to Argentina but 
not from Mexico to Chile. His tests indicate that volatility was transmitted 
from one country to the other  but they do not indicate if this propagation 
change during the crisis. 
 
v) Probit and logit: This method uses simplifying assumptions and 
exogeneous events to identify a model and directly measure changes in the 
propagation mechanism.  
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A seminal approach to the empirical analysis of contagion is made by 
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996). The authors construct an index of 
Exchange Rate Market Pressure (ERP), as a weighted average of changes in 
the exchange rate, short-term interest rates and international reserves. As a 
dependent variable, they define a ‘crisis dummy’ that takes a unit value for 
extreme values of ERP (and zero otherwise) and estimate a probit model 
with a set of macroeconomic and political fundamentals among the 
independent variables.  
 
Their estimates from a panel of 20 industrialized countries from 1959 to 
1993 show that the occurrence of a currency crisis in one country increases 
the probability of a speculative attack in other countries by 8 percentage 
points. This effect is not only statistically significant, but the crisis dummy 
results the most significant variable in the model. The authors also try to 
compare two different causes for transmission: trade linkages and 
macroeconomic similarities. They build an indicator of trade linkages and 
one of macroeconomic similarities and find that when they include both 
indicators in the model only the first one is statistically significant. 
 
This technique has since been widely used. Kumar et al. (1998), who refine 
the model by adding lagged financial and macroeconomic variables, claim 
that their model has a high explanatory power. In fact, major crashes 
(Mexico in 1994, Thailand and Korea in 1997) are correctly forecast. 
Moreover, they show that trading strategies based on their out-of sample 
forecasts could have yield positive profits during these two episodes.  
 
Baig e Goldfajn (1998), using a probit model study the impact of daily news 
in one country’s stock market on other countries markets during the 1997-8. 
They find that a substantial proportion of a country’s news impacts 
neighboring economies. 
 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) estimate the conditional probability that a 
crisis will occur in a given country and find that this probability increases 
when more crises are occurring in other countries, especially in the same 
region. 
 
Caramazza (2000) also estimate a probit model on a large data set of 61 
industrial and emerging countries. They focus on the role of external and 
internal macroeconomic imbalances, financial weaknesses (proxied by the 
ratio between short-term debt and international reserves), trade and financial 
linkages. In particular, their model shows that trade linkages (measured by 
an index constructed to account also for third market competition) and 
financial linkages (represented by correlation with the stock market of the 
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crisis country) play a significant role in explaining the transmission of 
currency crises.
 
 
vi) The leading indicators methodology16: A somewhat different approach to 
the analysis of currency crises is proposed by Kaminsky et al. (1998), who 
evaluate the ability of a set of macroeconomic and financial indicators to 
forecast the occurrence of a currency crisis correctly. In line with previous 
models, a crisis is defined as a month in which the variable ERP takes 
extreme values17. For each indicator the authors establish a threshold S, so 
that the indicator is said to release a signal whenever it is larger than S. To 
fix the threshold optimally, the authors consider the indicator obtained from 
the following table: 
 
 
 Crisis within 24 months no Crisis within 24 months 
signal A(S) B(S) 
no signal C(S) D(S) 
 
 
where A and B are the number of months in which the indicator gives a 
good and a bad signal, respectively, C is the number of months in which the 
indicator fails to release a signal, and D is the number of months in which 
the indicator does not release a signal correctly. For each indicator, an 
optimal threshold is determined as the solution to the problem min B/A. 
Kaminsky et al. (1998) identify with this method 12 useful indicators. 
 
This approach has been refined and tested in several papers. Kaminsky 
(1999) computes a single composite indicator given by a weighted average 
of the previous indicators.  
 
Berg and Pattillo (1999) show that the original set of indicators developed 
by Kaminsky et al. (1998) performed poorly in predicting the Asian 
currency crisis. They estimate the thresholds with data available until April 
1995, and find that most of the months of crisis (about 91 per cent) were not 
signalled, while around 44 per cent of the crisis signals were false alarms. 
 
In a recent paper, Ansuini and Gandolfo (2003) point out that the Kaminsky 
et al. approach gives some information on the variables that drive the crisis. 
However, according to the authors, its forecasting ability, at least in its 
application to the Thai crisis, seems to be far from powerful. 
 
 
                                                          
16
 Sbracia and Pericoli (2001). 
17
 Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996). 
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I.3.2. Some econometric issues: Shift contagion or interdependence? 
The test for contagion is one of the empirical puzzles in international 
economics. Tests for contagion may be biased in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, endogeneity and omitted variables. 
 
In the next section we use a simple model (Forbes and Rigobon, 2001) to 
show how all the three econometric problems above mentioned can bias 
tests for changes in cross-market transmission mechanisms (i.e. shift 
contagion).  
 
Assume that there are two countries whose stock market returns are xt and yt 
which are described by the following model: 
 
 
yt  = tztxt ηγα ++  
tztytxt εβ ++=  
[ ] 0' =ttE εη
   
[ ] 0' =tztE ε
   
[ ] 0=tztE η
      
[ ] 2' ttttE εσεε =
   
[ ] 2' tttE ησηη =
   
[ ] 2' ztztztE σ=
   
 
where: εt and tη  are country-specific shocks that are assumed to be 
independent but not necessarily identically distributed. Assume also that the 
return has mean zero. Unobservable aggregate shocks (changes in global 
demand, exogeneous liquidity shocks, changes in international interest 
rates) are captured by zt . The latter is normalized for simplicity and is 
assumed to be independent of tε and tη .  
 
Shock are transmitted across countries through real linkages, the stock 
markets are expected to be endogeneous variables α,β ≠ 0. The variance of 
the idiosyncratic shocks changes through time to reflect the 
heteroscedasticity. Test for contagion estimate if the propagation 
mechanisms (α,β and γ) changes significantly during a crisis. 
 
Forbes and Rigobon (1999) prove that heteroscedasticity in market returns 
can have a significant impact on estimates of cross-market correlation18. For 
any distribution of error terms, when market volatility increases after a 
shock, the unadjusted correlation coefficient will be biased upward. In fact 
this unadjusted correlation coefficient is an increasing function of the 
market variance.  
                                                          
18
 See Appendix I. 
 25 
If the variance of xt goes to zero then all of the innovations in yt are 
explained by its idiosyncratic shocks (εt) and the correlation between xt and 
yt is zero. If xt experiences a shock and its variances increases, then a 
greater proportion of the fluctuation in yt is explained by xt. In the limit, 
when the variance of xt is so large that innovation in εt are negligible, then 
all the fluctuations in yt are explained by xt and the cross-market correlation 
will approach to one.  
 
The critical point is that the propagation (α) between xt and yt, remains 
constant. Since there is no significant change in how the shocks are 
transmitted across markets no contagion occurred. However since the 
correlation coefficient is biased upward after a shock, tests could incorrectly 
conclude that contagion occurred. 
 
The second problem which is possible to represent by this simple model is 
endogeneity. The first two equations are endogeneous and it is impossible to 
identify these equations and estimate the coefficient directly. For example, -
in test based on correlation coefficients or GARCH models there is no way 
to differentiate between shifts in the coefficients or shifts in the variances. 
 
The last problem with this model is omitted variables. When the variance of 
zt increases, the cross-market correlation are biased in the same way as 
when the variance of xt increases. When the variance of the aggregate shock 
is larger, the relative importance of component common to both markets 
grows, and the correlation between the two markets increases in absolute 
value. Since unobservable aggregate shocks as well as the stock price in 
other market would both be omitted variables, this bias is likely to be large 
and can have a significant impact on tests for contagion 
 
It is very difficult to adjust tests for all the three problems, nevertheless 
several papers have tried to correct for one or more of these problem and 
explore how these corrections affect tests for contagion. 
 
Forbes and Rigobon (1999) focus on how heteroscedasticity affects tests for 
contagion using cross-market correlation coefficients. Lomakin and Paiz 
(1999) use a similar technique to examine the impact of heteroscedasticity 
on tests. Each of these papers makes simplifying assumptions so as to avoid 
the problems of endogeneity and omitted variables. Rigobon (1999) takes a 
slightly different approach and makes a more restrictive set of identifying 
assumptions in order to simultaneously correct for heteroscedasticity, 
endogeneity and omitted variables. 
 
Forbes and Rigobon (1999) use daily data for stock indices of up to 28 
developed and emerging markets to test evidence of contagion during three 
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crisis episodes: i) 1997, East Asian crisis, ii) 1994, Mexican crisis, iii) 1987, 
US stock market crash.  
 
They show that correlation coefficients for multi-country returns are not 
significantly higher during crisis periods if the problems of endogeneity, 
omitted variables and heteroscedasticity are properly corrected for. Forbes 
and Rigobon conclude that when is defined as a significant increase in the 
cross-market relationships and correlation coefficients are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity, there was virtually no contagion during the East Asian 
crisis, Mexican peso collapse and US stock market crash. 
 
Lomakin and Paiz (1999) make the same simplifying assumptions as Forbes 
and Rigobon (1999) to address the problem of heteroscedasticity in test for 
contagion in bond markets. They use a probit analysis to compute the 
likelihood that one country will have a crisis given that another country has 
already experienced one. They find that estimates of this probability will be 
biased in the presence of heteroscedasticity and that it is impossible to 
identify the direction of this bias. 
 
Rigobon (1999) makes a different set of simplifying assumption in order to 
directly identify his model. His assumptions not only solve for endogeneity, 
but also are valid in the presence of heteroscedasticity and omitted 
variables. A significant advantage of identifying the model directly is that it 
is possibile to directly estimate the size of the propagation mechanisms. 
 
Rigobon’s key assumption is that during a crisis the variance of the 
disturbances in only one market increases. Using this assumption, he 
develops a test where the joint null hypothesis is that only one of the 
variances of the structural shocks increases and the transmission 
mechanisms is stable. The test is therefore rejected if either the transmission 
mechanism changes (i.e. contagion occurs) or if the variances of two or 
more disturbances increase. 
 
Rigobon (1999) then uses this methodology to test if the cross country 
propagation of shocks is fairly stable between stock markets during the 
Mexican, East Asian, and Russian crises. He estimates the same basic model 
as in Forbes and Rigobon (1999) and tests for a significant change in 
transmission mechanisms between the stable period before each crisis and 
the tumultuous period directly after each crisis. In tests for contagion within 
one month of each crisis, he finds that transmission mechanisms increase 
significantly in less than 15 percent of the cross-country pairs (and in less 
than 7 percent during the Mexican crisis.) A sensitivity analysis indicates 
that model specification can affect results, but in most cases when the 
results change significantly, there is more than one crisis during the 
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tumultuous period (which increases the chance of the test being rejected). 
Rigobon concludes that transmission mechanisms were fairly stable and that 
shift contagion occurred in less than 10 percent of the stock markets during 
recent financial crises. 
 
 
Concluding remarks and further research 
This chapter is aimed at surveying and analysing the theoretical and 
empirical literature on international transmission of shocks. It focuses on the 
recent debate on financial contagion which compares the hypotheses of 
interdependence and shift contagion. Through the analysis of the literature it 
is possible to point out some interesting issues. 
 
First, what emerges clearly is that in literature there is not yet a uniform 
definitions of what constitutes contagion. The exact definition (and causes) 
of contagion are not known neither are the precise policy interventions that 
can most effectively reduce contagion and moreover according to different 
definitions, theories, empirical tests results and policy implications change. 
 
In particular, it seems of great interest to distinguish the definitions of shift 
contagion and interdependence. According to the first definition the 
transmission mechanisms of international shocks change during a crisis, 
according to the second definition they do not change. Therefore, there is 
not an excess of co-movement and the transmission channels are the same 
during crises and during stable period. 
 
Second, the still unresolved dispute concerning shift contagion versus 
interdependence is reflected in the division of the literature in two blocks: 
crisis contingent (shift contagion) theories and non crisis contingent 
(interdependence) theories. Next to the broad theoretical literature the 
extensive empirical literature could be generated by the attempt to give a 
solution at the shift contagion versus interdependence puzzle. 
 
Nevertheless the empirical results are heterogeneous. It is worth to notice 
that the tests for contagion that are not corrected for the main econometric 
problems (heteroscedasticisty, endogeneity and omitted variables) are 
biased. As a result tests for contagion that are not adjusted for may suggest 
that contagion occurred, even when cross- market transmission mechanisms 
are stable. 
 
Third each of the papers that has attempted to correct for heteroscedasticity, 
endogeneity and/or omitted variables has shown that the bias from these 
problems is not insignificant and will affect estimates of contagion during 
recent financial crises. These papers use a variety of different approaches, 
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identification assumptions, and model specifications to adjust for one (or 
more) of these problems. They find that transmission mechanisms were 
fairly stable during recent financial crises, and since contagion is defined as 
a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock, this suggests 
that little contagion occurred during recent crises. 
 
According to this findings, further empirical research should focus on why 
countries are always so vulnerable to movements in other countries. Why do 
so many markets of such different sizes, structures, and geographic 
locations generally show such a high degree of co-movement? Does trade 
with third markets link these diverse countries? What is the role of Free 
Trade Agreements? Is there an "excess interdependence" across markets in 
all states of the world? And in this case, what theories could explain the 
excess of interdependence? 
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Chapter II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trade and transmission of currency shocks in Central Eastern 
European “new” European Union members. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The object of this study is to assess the role of trade in the transmission of 
currency shocks across geographically close countries. The analysis will 
focus on identifying and comparing the degree of vulnerability to currency 
shocks of Central Eastern European countries (CEECs) EU members. 
 
Recent empirical evidence shows that post-shock transmission mechanisms 
seem to be a continuation of close linkages existing during stable periods. 
Studies by Forbes (2001), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), Caramazza et al. 
(1999), Glick and Rose (1998), Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) 
have provided evidence supporting the hypothesis that currency crises 
spread from one country to another because of trade linkages. They also 
show that explanations of the international transmission of currency shocks 
based on trade links across countries perform empirically better than 
explanations based on similarities in the macroeconomic characteristics of 
the economies concerned. 
 
The relevance of trade has been considered mainly in empirical analysis 
characterised by few linkages with theoretical tools. The most of above-
mentioned empirical studies identified and measured trade links by means 
of total export shares either bilateral or in common markets. Theoretical 
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papers studying competitive devaluation in a Centre Periphery (C-P) 
framework suggest that further progress in the empirical testing of the 
relevance of trade as transmission channel can be achieved through deeper 
analysis of trade structure and firms pricing behaviour.  
 
In the analysis that follows the Periphery consists of the group of eight 
CEECs (Central Eastern European countries). We intend to interpret the 
interactions that the C-P model identifies for Periphery countries as a 
possible description of interdependencies existing among geographically 
close countries. We will build trade indicators for CEECs and use them to 
gauge how specific features of their trade structure could affect the 
vulnerability to exchange rate shocks. 
 
Following accession to EU, CEECs will have to adopt the euro, as no opt-
out clause is allowed for new entrants. Official positions of European 
Commission and the European Central Bank indicate that the CEECs should 
go through the Exchange Rate Mechanism II before the adoption of the 
euro. This would imply two years in ERM II system with a review of 
Maastricht indicators at the end of the first year. With few exceptions the 
CEECs will have eventually to change their exchange rate regime. 
  
The choice to focus on CEECs is due to three main reasons: (i) they have a 
high degree of trade integration with EU, intra regional trade occurs and 
thus they are suitable for representing the periphery of EU-15, (ii) their 
financial markets are not yet fully developed and integrated, thus providing 
trade linkages with a major role in transmitting the currency shocks, (iii) 
they are expected to join the ERM II19 abandoning the exchange rate as 
instrument to absorb shocks.  
 
The proposed approach attempts to make the following contributions to the 
existing literature: (i) it bridges the gap between the theory and the empirics 
of transmission of currency shocks via trade linkages; (ii) it explicitly takes 
into consideration trade structure and firms’ pricing behaviour and their 
effects on transmission of currency shocks (iii) it focuses on CEECs to 
derive policy implications on potential sustainability of ERM II. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows. In the first chapter section I.1 surveys 
the theory and empirics of the transmission of crises via trade links. 
Relationships between trade features and vulnerability to shocks in a 
Centre-Periphery framework are described in section I.2. In the second 
chapter section II.1 we analyse the relation between trade structure and 
                                                          
19
 In June 2004 Lithuania, Estonia and Slovenia joined the ERM II. 
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currency shocks transmission. Some preliminary results are presented in the 
last paragraph.  
 
 
II.1. Transmission of crises via trade links: Theory and empirics 
This chapter concentrates on trade linkages as a channel for spreading the 
effects of economic disturbances and in particular currency crises. The 
choice is due also to the decision of studying CEECs. In fact, in these 
countries the financial markets and the banking sector are not yet fully 
developed and integrated providing trade linkages with a major role in 
transmitting the shocks.  
 
Furthermore, recent empirical studies ((Forbes (2001), Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (2000), Caramazza et al. (1999), Glick and Rose (1998), 
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996)) have found strong evidence to 
support the hypothesis that currency and financial crises spread from one 
country to another because of trade linkages20.  
 
 
II.1.1 The theoretical literature 
Theoretical and empirical investigation into the role of trade channels has to 
date been rather limited in its scope. In particular, the relevance of trade has 
often only been considered by empirical analyses..      
 
To explain why crises tend to be regional, some recent theoretical models21. 
have revived Nurske’s (1944) model of competitive devaluation. According 
to the latter, trade being bilateral or/and with a third part, once one country 
devalues, it makes costly - in term of competitiveness and output- for other 
countries to maintain their parity. An empirical implication of this type of 
model is that a high volume of trade among the countries involved in a crisis 
could be observed. 
 
These models analyse how devaluations by one country spreads to others, 
adopting a Centre Periphery framework. They enable disentanglement of the 
income and price effects that a devaluation in a country A in the Periphery 
exerts on a country B in the same region via direct links between these 
countries and competition in a third country of the Centre (C). 
 
The price effect is due to the fact that devaluations in A, in the presence of 
nominal rigidities, improve its competitiveness. This causes both an increase 
                                                          
20
 For a complete survey of literature see chapter I. 
21
 See Bentivogli and Monti (2001) for a complete survey which include a further three, 
sometimes overlapping, categories: (i) models with strategic interactions (ii) models which 
examine the characteristics of trade structure, (iii) models which emphasize geography. 
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in the demand from Centre to Periphery goods and a diversion in world 
demand away from B goods towards A goods. The income effect operates 
through the improvement in B’s and C’s terms of trade and the worsening of 
those of country A. 
 
These two effects have been modelled by Gerlach and Smets (1995) and, in 
a fully micro founded general equilibrium model, by Corsetti et al. 
(1998b)22. Both models capture bilateral trade and competition in the third 
market by describing a three-country world where countries A and B peg 
their currencies to country C’s. In the models a nominal devaluation in A 
translates into a competitiveness gain at least in the short run due to either 
sticky wages or price rigidities. 
 
Gerlach and Smets model formally how a devaluation in country A can 
affect trade flows and thereby cause a crisis in country B. They assume that 
the economies are structurally identical and that each of them produces only 
one specific good, but consume all three goods. A devaluation in A gives 
rise, with sticky wages, to a fall in output, a trade deficit, and a reduction in 
B’s price level due to the fact that the prices of A goods in B’s currency fall. 
The excess demand for money arising in B (assuming non accommodating 
monetary policy) exerts downward pressures on the nominal interest rate, 
leading to capital outflows, reserves losses, and it may generate a currency 
crisis.  
 
The model shows that the intensity of the transmission through trade is 
stronger (i) the higher the substitutability between A and B goods, (ii) the 
greater the weight of foreign goods in B’s consumption basket. This model 
highlights some important aspects. Nevertheless, belonging to the traditional 
Mundell-Fleming framework, it lacks a micro foundation, it does not focus 
on the role played by competition in third markets, and it only touches on 
the issue of pass-through.  
 
Corsetti et al. (1998b) use micro-foundation to develop a more detailed and 
rigorous model of how trade can transmit crises internationally. They use a 
general equilibrium choice–theoretic framework to compute the welfare 
repercussions of a devaluation of A’s currency, finding that the negative 
effects on a partner country emphasized by traditional theory are not always 
present. Indeed, if the effects deriving from the change in the terms of trade 
are taken into account, the results may be rather different.  
 
 
                                                          
22 The latter constitutes the theoretical basis for the empirical application that We intend to 
conduct in this chapter and it will be thoroughly discussed in section I.2. 
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II.1.2 Main empirical studies 
Studies on the transmission of financial and currency crises via trade have 
followed various routes on the basis of the methodologies and variables set 
out in the empirical literature. Moreover, they are not closely linked to the 
theoretical literature. This literature might be grouped in two broad 
categories: (i) “Contagion” and trade linkages and (ii) “Contagion” and 
trade structure. 
 
(i) “Contagion” and trade linkages. One of the first analyses in this field 
was produced by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996), who tested the 
influence of bilateral trade and competition in the third market on the 
transmission of currency crises. They defined contagion as “a systematic 
effect on the probability of a speculative attack which stems from attacks on 
other currency”. 
 
To test contagion from country j to country i, they regressed a binary 
variable of currency crisis23 – the “crisis dummy” – in country i on the same 
variable for country j weighted by trade data, and on other macroeconomic 
variables: 
 
Crisisi,t = ω Wij,t Crisisj,t + λ I(L)i,t + εi,t 
 
Where: Wij for j ≠ i is equal to the weight of country j in country i’s IMF 
real effective exchange rate index. These weights take account of both 
bilateral trade and competition in third markets.24  
 
Eichengreen et al. also substituted Wij with a weight measuring relative 
macroeconomic similarity. This weight is closer to one the more similar are 
the standardized growth rates of the relevant macroeconomic variables. 
I(L)i,t is an information set of contemporaneous and lagged macroeconomic 
variables. Eichengreen et al. estimated the equation by using a probit model 
with quarterly data. Their estimate for 20 industrial countries from 1959 to 
1993 showed that the occurrence of a currency crisis in one country 
increased the likelihood of speculative attacks in other countries by about 
8%. The coefficient of contagion ω was positive and significant when trade 
weights were used, while macroeconomic weights did not perform as well. 
The authors concluded that trade links are the main channel through which 
crisis is transmitted. 
 
                                                          
23
 They developed an index of foreign exchange rate pressure as a weighted average of 
exchange rate changes and short term interest rates relative to Germany. This variable 
"crisis" took value 1 if the index was above a certain threshold, and 0 otherwise 
24
 IMF weights consider only trade in manufacturing and are time invariant. For a detailed 
description of the methodology see IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
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Caramazza et al. (1999) have estimated a similar equation using a panel 
probit regression with 41 emerging market countries and, separately, 20 
industrial countries during the Mexican, Asian and Russian crises, excluding 
for each crisis the first country to experience it. 
 
Their crisis variable is very similar in structure to than of Eichengreen et al. 
In country i it is regressed on, among other variables, a set of external 
variables in the years preceding the crisis25 plus a proxy for trade effect: 
 
Crisisi,t = αTCij,t + βFCi,t +γΜi,t + εi,t 
 
The proxy TC is a weighted average of the price and income effects 
expected to spread from devaluation in a partner country. Caramazza et al. 
choose a relative weight of one to two on the basis of estimates of historical 
export elasticities. They identify the price effect with the expected loss of 
competitiveness in country i due to a crisis in other countries, proxying this 
effect with the change in the IMF real effective exchange rate index for 
country i. This index weights the devaluation in partner countries both by 
bilateral trade and by competition in third markets. Caramazza et al. adjust it 
to exclude own-country effects by replacing the actual exchange rate change 
and inflation of country i during the crisis with a projection based on trends 
over the three years previous to the crisis. 
 
The income effect is captured by an indicator of the expected output 
contraction of countries which are export markets for country i. The output 
contraction is measured with respect to the average growth rates in the three 
years before the crisis, and trade weights are used to aggregate the data. FC 
is a set of indicators of financial linkages including the share of debt 
borrowed by country i from a common creditor country, and Mit is a set of 
macroeconomic variables. 
 
Caramazza et al. find that TC is not significant, but that it becomes so when 
multiplied by previous years’ current account balances. This seems to 
suggest that the trade channel significantly affects country i's probability of 
crisis only when it is already suffering from external imbalances. 
 
Another interesting finding by Caramazza et al. is that region-specific 
dummies are not significantly different from each other. This suggests that 
the clustering of crises is explained by the independent variables and 
therefore that crises are not strictly regional phenomena.  
 
                                                          
25The current account balance/GDP ratio and the change in the real effective exchange rate, 
in the export/GDP ratio and in the terms of trade. 
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Glick and Rose (1998) test trade against other macroeconomic factors in 
order to check whether contagion is regional. They estimate a cross-country 
equation with 161 countries in five crisis episodes: 
 
Crisisi = φTradei + λΜi + εi 
 
where: Crisis is a binary variable, M is a set of macroeconomic indicators 
which includes the annual growth rate of internal credit and real GDP, the 
current account balance divided by GDP, and the change in the nominal 
effective exchange rate during the year of crisis compared to the average of 
the past three years. Trade is an indicator of trade linkages defined as: 
 
Tradei = ( )[ ] ( )[ ]{ } +−−++
k
kikkikiikk xxxxxxxx 0000 /1*)/(  
 
where xik are exports from i to k  (k≠i, 0), and 0 is the first victim country, x0 
are total exports of country 0 and xi are total exports of country i. This 
indicator is a weighted average of the contribution of third markets for the 
first victim country 0 and for country i. The weights, the second term of the 
index, imply that country k is more important for countries 0 and i, the more 
similar the importance of k is for each of them. 
 
Glick and Rose also use other indicators: Direct Trade (DT), Total Trade 
(TT) and Trade Share (TS), which they define respectively as follows: 
 
DTi = ( )iiii xxxx 0000 /1 +−−  
 
TTi= ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]iiiiiiiii xxxxDTTxxxx ++++−− 0000000 /**/1  
 
TSi= ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]{ } +−−++
k
ikkiikkiikk xixxxxxxxxxxx /////1*)/( 000000  
 
Direct Trade is a measure of bilateral trade, Total Trade is a weighted index 
of bilateral trade and with respect to the third market, and Trade Share is an 
index similar to Trade but adjusted for trade shares to control for the 
different sizes of the countries. These measures seem to be relatively 
insensitive to the way in which trade linkages are measured. 
 
Glick and Rose (1998) find strong evidence to support the hypothesis that 
currency crises spread from one country to another because of trade 
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linkages. They accordingly conclude that currency crises are fundamentally 
regional phenomena26. 
 
(ii) “Contagion” and trade structure. Diwan and Hoeckman (1999) 
analyse the effects of trade structure on transmission of shocks in terms of a 
"competition versus complementarity" account. They argue that countries 
with very similar export structures will compete mainly in third markets 
outside the region. In this case, the price effect of devaluations by a trade 
competitor will be negative and the positive income effect almost absent, 
with a consequent strong incentive to match the devaluation. On the other 
hand, if most of the trade in a region concerns goods complementary in 
production (i.e. intermediate goods), then the price effect of a devaluation 
by a partner is positive for all countries in the region because it enhances the 
competitiveness of the "joint" production.  
 
Taking indicators of trade structure into account, Diwan and Hoeckman 
(1999) test the hypothesis of competition-versus-complementarity for East 
Asian countries by using a set of trade indicators. They analyse intra- and 
inter-regional demand linkages by calculating shares of intra-extra regional 
trade of each country and a trade intensity index (XI) on both total 
merchandise exports and intermediate goods defined as: 
 
XIi= (Xij/Xi)/[Mj/(Mw-Mi)] 
 
where: X and M are respectively exports and imports, and i, j and w denote 
the reporting country, the partner and the world. If this index control for the 
size of the partner country is greater than 1, trade is more intense than would 
be expected, given a share j of world imports. This index has the defect that 
it allows neither cross-country nor cross-time comparisons. Moreover, it is 
sensitive to the size of country i: the bigger the country, the lower the index. 
In order to test the competition hypothesis, Diwan and Hoeckman compute 
export correlations and export similarity indexes for extra- and intra-
regional trade27: 
 
XSij = ( )[ ]
a
xajxai 100*,min  
 
where: xai and xaj are the industry a exports shares in country i's and j's total 
exports, calculated at the 4 digit SITC level.  
                                                          
26 A limitation of the trade linkages used in the studies described above is that all of them 
are calculated on total trade flows, with no analysis of the trade structure in terms of 
products.  
27
 This measure was first proposed by Finger and Kreinin (1979). 
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The index ranges between 0 and 100, with 0 indicating complete 
dissimilarity and 100 identical export composition. The authors find a high 
degree of intra-regional trade in total and intermediate goods, supporting the 
close interdependence and complementarity hypothesis of East Asian 
trade28. 
 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) recognize that most of the empirical studies 
focus on bilateral trade and that when third party trade is considered little 
attention is given to the commodity composition of potential competitors.  
 
The authors select groups of countries in terms of either high bilateral trade 
between them or of competition in a relevant third market, examining a 
sample of industrial and developing countries for the period 1970-1998, 
including 80 currency crises. They choose bilateral trade clusters by 
inspecting the ratios of exports in the region to total exports of each country. 
For third market competitors they also inspect similarities in the product 
composition of trade. 
 
For each cluster of countries Kaminsky and Reinhart compare the 
unconditional probability of a crisis occurring in the next 24 months P(C) 
with the probability conditioned on the information that there is a crisis 
elsewhere P(C/CE). They treat the difference between these two 
probabilities as an indicator of the relevance of the trade channel. 
 
They find evidence that belonging to the same region as a crisis country 
increases the probability for other countries of currency crisis occurrence 
due to trade linkages. 
 
Forbes (2000) utilizes firm-level information to measure the importance of 
trade in the international transmission of crises. The paper sample includes 
information on over 10.000 companies from around the world during the 
Asian and the Russian crises. It focuses on the variation in different 
company’s stock market performance, which not only tests which types of 
companies were most affected by these crises but also how these crises 
spread internationally. Results show that companies which had sales 
exposure to the crisis country and/or competed in the same industries as 
crisis-country exports had significantly lower stock returns during these two 
                                                          
28 According to Bentivogli and Monti (2001), “Diwan and Hoeckman’s account is 
unsatisfactory in relating the trade structure to the transmission of crisis. As the "new trade 
theories" explain, countries which export very similar goods will have a large amount of 
bilateral (intra-industry) trade, so that competition will be strong both in regional markets 
and outside the region. This pattern of trade is typical of all industrial countries and of some 
emerging market economies as well. Diwan and Hoeckman’s "competition story" probably 
only applies to a region in which all countries export largely the same raw materials, so that 
bilateral trade is limited and competition in third markets is high.” 
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crises. The paper concludes that direct trade effects (income effects) as well 
as competition in export industries (product-competitiveness effects) “were 
both important transmission mechanisms during the later part of the Asian 
and the Russian crisis” (Forbes 2000). 
 
Forbes (2001) seeks to establish whether trade linkages are important 
determinants of a country’s vulnerability to crises originating elsewhere in 
the world. She maintains that trade can transmit crises internationally via 
three distinct, and possibly counteracting, channels: (i) the competitiveness 
effect, when changes in relative prices affect a country's ability to compete 
abroad; (ii) the income effect, when a crisis affects incomes and demand for 
imports, (iii) the cheap-import effect, when a crisis reduces import prices 
and acts as a positive supply shock. 
 
Forbes develops a series of statistics measuring each of these linkages for a 
sample of 58 countries during 16 crises from 1994 to 1999. Of particular 
interest is the competitiveness statistic, which uses 4-digit industry 
information to calculate how each crisis affects exports from other 
countries. The empirical results of Forbes’ study suggest that countries 
which compete with exports from a crisis country and which export to the 
crisis country (i.e. competitiveness and income effects) have significantly 
lower stock market returns. Although trade linkages only partially explain 
stock market returns during recent crises, they are significantly and 
economically important.  
 
Bentivogli and Monti (2001) concentrate on trade linkages as a channel for 
spreading the effects of economic disturbances, from one “source” country 
to other countries. They compare the degree of vulnerability to external 
shocks of five Latin American countries and five Asian crisis countries in 
the 1990s computing theoretically-backed indicators of vulnerability due to 
trade linkages. 
 
The indexes show that Latin America is much less vulnerable than Asia to 
an international transmission of economic disturbances from a country in 
the same region. This is due to: (i) the relatively lower openness of Latin 
American countries, (ii) the higher share of raw materials in their exports 
and (iii) the lower degree of similarity both of the manufactures exported 
inside their region and of those exported to their common industrial 
markets. Moreover, South-east Asian countries are more likely than Latin 
American ones to transmit economic disturbances to industrial countries due 
to the higher substitutability of their manufactured exports with those of 
more advanced economies. 
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II.2 Trade features and vulnerability to currency shocks in a Centre-
Periphery framework  
 
One of the aims of this chapter is to use the theoretical results of recent open 
macroeconomic models to develop “theoretically consistent” empirical 
analysis of how economic disturbances spread. The purpose is to get 
indications on how much are CEECs vulnerable to currency shocks given 
their trade structure. 
 
Among the theoretical models, the one suited to this purpose seems to be the 
Centre-Periphery model (C-P) developed by Corsetti et al. (1998b)29. Under 
certain hypotheses these authors reject the traditional hypothesis that 
devaluations have negative welfare repercussions on partner countries. The 
impact of devaluations in fact depends on the relative and absolute size of 
the parameters of the model, the most determinant of which are the 
following:  
 
(i) Elasticity of substitution between goods. The degree of substitutability 
of internationally traded goods is relevant in evaluating country's impact due 
to transmission of shocks via trade because it determines the size and the 
direction of the demand switching effects30. 
 
(ii) Firms pricing behaviour and exchange rate pass-through. It 
determines the extent to which, the effects of an exchange rate change are 
“passed through” to a firm’s export price. If the exchange rate is reflected in 
a one-for-one change in prices abroad, then it is referred to as “full pass-
through”. If none of the exchange rate change is reflected in prices abroad it 
is referred to as “no pass through”. 
 
With full pass-through, a devaluation of A's currency gives rise to an 
improvement in B's terms of trade, a reallocation of consumption away from 
B goods, a decline in the market share of B exports in C, and a depreciation 
of B's exchange rate vis-à-vis C. If B wants to maintain the peg with C, it 
must reduce the money supply, which implies greater appreciation vis-à-vis 
A and a greater loss of market share in C. If B instead matches the 
devaluation of A’s currency, B's terms of trade and market shares do not 
change. The model shows that the negative affects arising from devaluation 
in a partner country are off-set in some cases by an improvement in the 
terms of trade. In fact, with full pass-through, country B obtains also a 
welfare gain from devaluation in A because of the strong effect on welfare 
of its terms of trade improvement. 
                                                          
29
 See the appendix. 
30 The authors assume that the elasticity of substitution between Centre and Periphery 
goods is lower than or equal to that between Periphery goods, i.e. ρ≤ψ. 
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Table II.1a Vulnerability to currency shocks 
 
Corsetti et al. show that in the case of devaluations:  
If: Intra- Periphery trade =0 
then: 
 
 ψ>0 
Full pass-through  
(sellers currency) 
Beggar-thy-neighbour  
No pass-through  
(buyers currency) 
Low vulnerability to currency 
crisis 
 
If:     (i) ψ>ρ,  
        (ii) Intra- Periphery trade > 0 
 
then: 
 
 ψ>0 
Full pass-through  
(sellers currency) 
Ambiguous (Price effect and terms 
of trade effect) 
No pass-through  
(buyers currency) 
Beggar-thy-neighbour 
 
ψ elasticity of substitution between Periphery goods, 
ρ
 elasticity of substitution between Centre and Periphery goods. 
 
 
In case of no pass through Corsetti et al. show that there are no relative price 
competitiveness effects and export shares of the devaluating country remain 
the same. Country A’s devaluation is beggar thy-neighbour as it reduces 
exports, revenues and profits of producers in B. The conclusion are more 
striking than the ones derived under the assumption of full-pass through: the 
optimal response for country B is always to devalue. 
 
Therefore, according to the Centre Periphery model “if there is no pass-
through, then direct bilateral trade links may play a more important role 
than competition in the third market in determining the transmission of 
exchange rate shocks in the periphery. If there is full pass-through, a high 
share of bilateral trade within a region can actually limit the extent of 
beggar-thy neighbour effects” (Corsetti et al. 1998b) (tab II.1b). 
 
(iii) Degree of trade integration within the region. The stronger are the 
intra regional trade links the more vulnerable are the countries because of 
the negative demand switching effects of devaluations by competitors. 
However it has to be emphasized that under the assumption of full pass-
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through there are also positive effects of the improvement in terms of trade 
of the devaluing country partner. 
 
Table II.1b Transmission of currency shocks 
 
It depends on:
Elasticity of substitution between A's and B's goods
Elasticity of imports' demand to the price
Consumption basket composition in A and B
If Price eff>Terms  of trade eff
B devalues
Price competitiveness eff.
B exp. shares decrease in A and C
A exp.shares increase in B and C
It depends on:
Elasticity of substitution between A's and B's goods
Elasticity of imports' demand to the price
Consumption basket composition in A and B
If Terms of trade> Price eff.
B keeps the peg
Terms of trade eff.
imports from B are more expensive
Imports from A are less expensive
Full passthrough
No price competitiveness eff.
B export shares do not decrease
A export shares do not increase
Other things being equal
B has always the incentive to devalue
Imports from B are more expensive
A decreases demand of imports
No passthrough
A devalues
 
 
 
II.3. Indicators of vulnerability linked to trade structure 
 
II.3.1 Why analyse the CEECs case? 
The CEECs are a group of geographically close countries in the “periphery” 
of the EU. All the eight CEE countries that joined the EU on May 2004 
have declared their intention to adopt the euro as early as possible31. In 
terms of the announced monetary strategies of the countries it can be seen 
that for some of them the decision of join the ERM II32 soon, from today’s 
perspective, may not suffer from substantial objections. 
                                                          
31
 Following the procedures laid down in the Treaty of the Union, their aim is to introduce 
the euro at the beginning of 2007, subsequent to a two year mandatory period within ERM 
II starting around mid 2004 and a positive convergence assessment made around mid-2006. 
ECB, (2003), An analytical review of the acceding countries strategies towards the 
adoption of the euro and the ERM II, Internal Staff paper, March. 
32
 The ERM II is a pegged but adjustable system in which central parities are defined 
against the euro and not between all other participating countries. Hence this bilateral 
nature is expected to reduce the frequency and the scope of interventions. Central rates and 
fluctuation bands are set by common agreement involving the ministers of euro zone, the 
SECB governors of the AC. The standard fluctuation band is +-15% while not excluding 
the possibility of setting a narrower band. Intervention support of the ECB to NCB is 
automatic at the margins of the band (marginal interventions), any interventions within the 
band (intra-marginal intervention) need not to be (but may be) supported by the ECB. 
Finally realignments of central parity are made by the common procedure, which both the 
ECB and the member States have the right to initiate. 
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The open question is whether these countries would be able to cope with 
structural trends towards higher and more volatile output growth, increasing 
relative price levels and structural fiscal deficits without an independent 
monetary policy.  
 
Table II.2a: Exchange rate regimes and compatibility with the ERM II 
 
 
Ex. rate 
regime Currency Features 
Compatibility with 
ERM II 
Currency board  
Estonia Currency Board to euro 
Estonian 
kroon – EEK 
(euro 1 = 
15.6466 EEK) 
Peg to euro since 
1999 (to DM before) 
Yes. Estonia joined 
ERM II after acceding 
in June 2004. 
Lithuania Currency Board to euro 
Lithuanian 
litas – LTL 
(euro 1 = 
3.4528 LTL) 
Peg to euro since 2 
February 2002 (to US 
dollar from 1 April 
1994 to 2 February 
2002) 
Yes. Lithuania joined 
ERM II in June 2004. 
Fixed peg 
 
Latvia 
Peg to the 
SDR basket 
of currencies 
Latvian lats – 
LVL 
Exchange rate bands 
±1% of the central 
rate 
No, but planning to 
join ERM II and to 
peg to euro on 1 
January 2005. 
Pegged ex rates within horizontal bands (Unilateral shadowing of ERM II) 
Hungary Peg to euro 
Hungarian 
forint – HUF 
(euro 1= 284.1 
HUF)  
Peg to euro with ± 
15% fluctuation 
band.  Parity changed 
to 284.1 from 276.1 
as of 4th June 2003. 
Yes. 
Managed float  
Slovak 
Republic 
Managed 
float 
Slovakian 
koruna – SKK 
Euro as a reference 
currency. Foreign 
exchange market 
interventions. 
No. Slovak Republic 
envisages 
participation to ERM 
II in the medium 
term. 
Slovenia Managed float 
Slovenian 
tolar 
Euro informally used 
as a reference 
currency 
Yes. Slovenia joined 
the ERM II in June 
2004. 
Czech 
Republic 
Managed 
float 
Czech koruna 
– CZK 
Floating regime since 
May 1997 
No, but planning to 
join ERM II in the 
medium term. 
Free float  
Poland Free float Polish zloty – PLN Inflation targeting 
No, but planning to 
join ERM II and to 
peg to euro soon. 
Source: Pre-Acceding Economic Programs 2003, ECB, EC. 
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Also the four economies are the ones which would need the most aggressive 
fiscal tightening to meet Maastricht criteria in time for an early adoption of 
the euro, which may significantly aggravate the economic costs of joining 
ERM II.  
 
Hungary and Slovak Republic are those that have most closely managed the 
exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro, in the first case via a peg to the euro and in 
the former case via unilaterally shadowing a type of ERM II framework. 
Therefore, they might consider to substantially continue present 
arrangements and to join the ERM II immediately after EU acceding, 
provided that fiscal imbalances are being contained.  
 
For the Czech Republic and Poland, it may be preferable to maintain their 
current floating exchange rate regime for some time after EU entry, as 
inflationary targeting in these countries has overall proved a well-
functioning framework for monetary policy and has delivered the primary 
objective of low inflation. 
 
In the case of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia the decision to join 
the ERM II immediately after the accession and to adopt the euro after a 
short stay in ERM II may not run counter to substantial objections. In fact, 
these countries have already renounced to an autonomous monetary policy 
and they have managed to accommodate their catching up process without 
using the exchange rate as an adjustment tool. Furthermore, fiscal deficit are 
contained, public debt is small and structural policy have been supportive. 
 
The eight countries, with the relative exception of Poland, are small and 
highly open economies and they have tight trade relations with EU. The 
degree of financial integration between CEECs-8 countries and the euro 
area appears to be still not high and considerable differences exist across 
indicators and countries. All countries have experienced large and 
increasing capital inflows in recent years. By far the largest component of 
these flows is foreign direct investment which is the component of capital 
flows less vulnerable to financial and currency disturbances. 
 
Although total assets of banking systems as a ratio to GDP have risen in 
most acceding countries in recent years, the level of financial intermediation 
is low. This is due to the moderate GDP per capita levels, the relatively 
short history of banking sectors. 
 
Monetary transmission through interest and credit channels has become 
more effective in most acceding countries due to improved banking sector 
soundness but it is still constrained as consequence of the low depth of 
financial intermediation. 
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According to this research, the CEECs case is of great interest to study the 
transmission of currency shocks via trade, for three main reasons: 
 
(i) The CEECs are going to join (joined in the case of Estonia, Lithuania and 
Slovenia) the ERM II (see tab 2.b) and eventually the EMU, abandoning 
flexible exchange rate as effective instrument for absorbing shocks.  
 
Table II.2.b Timing of ERM II and Euro adoption 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Czech Republic   ERM II  EMU 
Estonia* ERM II   EMU   
Hungary  ERM II   EMU  
Lithuania* ERM II   EMU   
Latvia  ERM II   EMU  
Poland   ERM II   EMU 
Slovenia* ERM II   EMU   
Slovak Republic   ERM II  EMU 
*27 June 2004 
Source: Deutsche Bank Research, ECB 
 
(ii) The CEECs are a group of geographically close countries very suitable 
for representing the Periphery of EU. They have a high degree of trade 
integration with European Union and some intra periphery trade occurs. It is 
possible to interpret the interdependences existing among them bilaterally 
and in the centre as the interaction that the C-P model identifies for 
periphery countries. 
 
(iii) The CEECs’ financial markets are not yet fully developed and 
integrated. They seem to have a minor role in transmitting currency shocks. 
Thus trade linkages seem to be the main channel of transmission of 
disturbances. 
 
This chapter tries to answer to two main issues: (i) have trade and firms 
pricing behaviour of CEECs any role in determining the vulnerability to 
currency shocks? (ii) What are the implication for the ERM II 
sustainability? If after/due to the joining of ERM II a currency shock occurs 
in one of CEECs which is the probability of a contagious devaluation in the 
other countries in the group?  
 
 
II.3.2 Trade integration with EU and intra regional trade. 
The evolution of trade in acceding countries has been remarkable in the 90s. 
The degree of openness increased dramatically. The integration with the EU 
market (further strengthened by the European Association Agreement 
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signed bilaterally by those countries33) led to an increase of their market 
shares in EU trade34. 
 
The degree of openness is on average 92 % of GDP (56.7% when taking 
into account only trade with EU). The most open countries are Estonia, 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The eight CEECs entertain close trade 
relations with the EU, accounting on average for about 63.7% of total export 
and about 60.5% of total import (tab. 3). This compares well with the level 
of trade integration among the current EU members, whose exports and 
imports within the EU are on average around 60% of total trade.  
 
Table II.3 Degree of openness and trade integration CEEC-8 
(2002) 
 Degree of openness 
(Exp+imp)/GDP, %) 
(ExpEu+ImpEu) 
/(ExpWorld+Imp 
World) 
Trade integration 
with EU 
(EU export and import 
in % of total export 
and import) 
  To World To EU 
 
Export Import 
Czech Rep. 94.9 60.8 0.64 68.3 60.1 
Estonia 133.3 82.8 0.62 68.0 57.9 
Hungary 91.1 59.4 0.65 75.1 56.3 
Latvia 75.7 57.2 0.76 60.4 84.1 
Lithuania 92.1 43.3 0.47 49.6 45.2 
Poland 42.3 27.4 0.65 68.7 61.7 
Slovak Rep. 109.4 60.2 0.55 60.5 50.3 
Slovenia 97.3 62.1 0.64 59.4 68.0 
Average 92 56.7 0.62 63.7 60.5 
Source: Our calculation on WEO IMF, Eurostat New Cronos, Bilateral Trade Database 
(BTD) and International Trade by Commodity Statistics (ITCS), 2003. 
 
It is worth to notice that, in the group, the countries that are relatively more 
highly integrated with the EU (Hungary, Latvia and Poland) are those with 
the lowest degree of openness. The most open economies, such as Estonia, 
Slovenia, Czech and Slovak Republic, are relatively less integrated with the 
EU. The lower trade integration with the EU might suggest that these 
countries, which significantly trade also with non EU countries, could be 
somewhat more exposed to external demand shocks originating from third 
countries than EU area. 
 
The analysis of the bilateral export shares by destination of CEE countries 
confirms that the EU is the main market of destinations, USA and Japan 
                                                          
33
 This issue will be further analyzed in the third chapter. 
34
 Zaghini (2003) 
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having a minor role as export markets. Among the eight countries (tab.4) 
trade shares with the other CEE countries are heterogeneous with the lowest 
shares for Slovenia and the highest for Latvia. 
 
Two sub-groups emerge in which trade is more intensive. The first one is 
composed by the four largest countries OECD members (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic), while the second includes the 
Baltics (Estonia Latvia and Lithuania) plus Slovenia. There is evidence of 
intra groups trade in the region, though it seems to play a minor role. 
 
Table II.4 Bilateral export shares by destination 
(Total exports %, 2002) 
      Report 
Partner 
CZ.R. H P SK. R. E LV L S. 
Czech Rep.  2.4 4.7 7.7 0.3 1 0.8 0.1 
Hungary 1.9  2.1 1.4 0.6 0.2 1.6 0.4 
Poland 4 2.3  1.4 0.5 0.3 6.3 0.1 
Slov.Rep. 15.2 5.4 5.3  1.8 1.8 2.8 0.1 
Estonia      6 3.2 0.1 
Latvia     7.7  12.6 12.6 
Lith*     4.1 8.35  0.3 
Slovenia     0.02 0.1 0.0  
EU 68.3 75.1 68.7 60.5 60 67.3 63.1 66.2 
USA 2.9 3.5 2.7 1.4 2.2 4.3 3.8 2.8 
Japan 0.4 0.6 0.2 1 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.2 
World 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Our calculation on OECD, Bilateral Trade Database (BTD) and International Trade 
by Commodity Statistics (ITCS), 2003 and our calculation on United Nations, 
Comtrade 2003 
*2001 
 
According to classification SITC Rev 3 two digit by each of the eight 
countries manufactured goods account on average for about 77.4% of export 
towards EU in CEE countries. The national export shares of each product 
proxy the importance for any given country of demand switching effects 
that could arise from a devaluation by a competitor in that specific market.  
 
Interestingly, all the eight countries have a very similar export product 
composition with machinery and transport equipment ranking in the first 
position. Manufactured goods, miscellaneous manufactured articles and 
Chemicals and related products have also a major role in export structure of 
the most of CEECs. 
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A large part of CEECs trade with the EU is intra industrial, most of which is 
classified as vertical intra-industrial trade. This may suggest that countries 
with a high degree of intra-industrial trade will be subject to similar shocks 
and pattern of industrial activity. 
 
Table II.5 Glick and Rose trade linkages* (2002) 
Countries 
pairs 
Competition in third markets (EU) 
(TradeShare35 SITC Rev.3) 
Direct linkages 
(Direct trade36, SITC Rev.3,) 
 Total Manufactures Total Manufactures 
ee-lv 0.59 0.69 0.58 0.59 
ee-sk 0.62 0.72 0.85 0.53 
ee-sl 0.62 0.70 0.32 0.27 
ee-hu 0.68 0.78 0.74 0.48 
ee-pol 0.66 0.76 0.51 0.55 
ee-cz 0.65 0.74 0.52 0.41 
cz-lv 0.67 0.81 0.36 0.31 
cz-sk 0.65 0.81 0.85 0.80 
cz-sl 0.65 0.83 0.87 0.93 
cz-hu 0.71 0.79 0.83 0.81 
cz-pol 0.68 0.79 0.94 0.86 
hu-lv 0.73 0.99 0.22 0.27 
hu-sk 0.70 0.96 0.78 0.83 
hu-sl 0.70 0.98 0.76 0.90 
hu-pol 0.72 0.92 0.89 0.86 
sl-sk 0.58 0.69 0.92 0.97 
sl-pol 0.66 0.73 0.62 0.56 
sl-lv 0.57 0.66 0.27 0.26 
pol-sk 0.66 0.88 0.83 0.79 
pol-lv 0.68 0.89 0.24 0.24 
sk-lv 0.59 0.72 0.51 0.43 
*2002 data for Lithuania are not available 
Source: Our calculation on COMTRADE UN, SITC Rev 3 two digit. 
 
Table 5 shows the Glick and Rose (1998) Trade share and Direct trade 
indexes measuring respectively competition in third market (EU) and direct 
trade linkages of CEECs. 
 
                                                          
35Trade Sharei = k{[(x0k+xik)/(x0+xi)]*[1-|(x0k/x0)-(xik/xi)|((x0k/x0)+(xik/xi))]} where: xik 
= export from i to k (k ≠ i, 0), 0 first victim country, x0 total export of 0, xi total export of i. 
This is a measure of trade linkages and competition in third markets which uses trade share 
so as to adjust for the varying size of countries. 
36 DirectTradei = 1- (| xi0-x0i |  (xi0 +x0i)). This index is higher the more equal are bilateral 
export between countries 0 and i. 
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The indexes prove a high competition for country pairs in EU market and 
extremely high bilateral trade links. It is worth to notice that, even given the 
very high manufactures content of CEECs trade, the indexes computed for 
total trade and trade in manufactures only, are not very similar. According 
to the Glick and Rose Trade share indexes, all countries, with no exception, 
seem to compete more heavily each other in the manufacture sector, having 
EU as destination market. 
 
The same result does not hold for intra-regional trade. In fact, the Direct 
trade indexes show that all the CEECs compete against each others with few 
exceptions (Estonia-Slovenia, Hungary-Latvia, Slovenia-Latvia and Poland-
Latvia). However the degree of competition, if only trade in manufacture is 
considered decreases in more than half of country pairs. 
 
 
II.3.3 Elasticity of substitution and trade structure 
The degree of substitutability of the different internationally traded goods is 
relevant in assessing a country’s vulnerability to transmission of currency 
shocks. Other things being equal, it determines the size and the direction of 
the demand switching effects. Indeed, the probability of a devaluation is 
higher in countries producing exports similar to those of the “first victims” 
country than in the others.  
 
Table II.6 Indexes of export similarity: the Finger and Kreinin index37 
(On manufactures in % of manufactures export, 2002, export market EU, SITC) 
 Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland S Rep Slovenia 
C. Rep. 80.7 85.3 47.7 61.1 87.4 94.7 88.4 
Estonia 
  70.4 66.6 75.4 91.2 85.2 88.4 
Hungary 
    71.2 53.6 76.7 80.4 74.5 
Latvia 
      59.1 60.2 51.9 57.7 
Lithuania 
        68.8 65.4 68.6 
Poland 
          92.2 95.3 
Sv.Rep. 
            93.4 
Source: Our calculation on Eurostat New Cronos, SITC Rev 3 two digit. 
 
One simple measure of the substitutability of each country’s exports is the 
Finger and Kreinin index38.  
                                                          
37
 •ESij =Σa [min (xai, xaj)]* 100, xai and xaj are export shares of country i’s and country j’s 
manufactures exports in industry a. ES=0 = complete dissimilarity, ES=100 = identical 
export composition 
38
 Finger and Kreinin (1979). It is worth to be underlined that the use of aggregate data for 
manufacture sector, due to the lack of more disentagled data could produce an 
overestimation of the indexes. 
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Table 6 shows the indexes values for manufactures products in percentage 
of total manufactures exports for 2002. They are computed for country pairs 
with SITC data. The common export market for country pairs is EU-15.  
The indexes show a high degree of similarity among the CEECs, with the 
exception of the country pair Czech Republic-Latvia, whereby the index is 
relatively smaller. According to these results, trade channels seem to have a 
powerful role in transmitting currency shocks.  
 
Moreover, the evidence that countries of the same group produce goods that 
are very similar/substitute in consumption, suggests that changes in their 
bilateral exchange rates may reduce, even significantly, the welfare of its 
regional trading partners, through the reduction in the demand for their 
exports. 
 
 
II.3.4 Firms pricing policy in response to exchange rate movements  
The exchange rate pass-through determines the extent to which, the effects 
of an exchange rate change are “passed through” to a firm’s export price. If 
the exchange rate is reflected in a one-for-one change in prices abroad, then 
it is referred to as “full pass-through”.  
 
Table II.7 Correlation between the export price index and the exchange 
rate against the euro 
(quarterly data, Q1-1999-Q4-2002) 
 
Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Slovak Rep. 
Correlation coef 0.2 0.9 0.8 -0.1 
Average elasticity 0.3 1 0.9 0.1 
 
(quarterly data, Q2-1999-Q4-2002) 
 
Estonia Latvia Lithuania Slovenia 
Correlation coef 0.0 -0.0 0.5 
Average elasticity 0.0 -0.2 0.4 
Hps *Coricelli, 
Zsolt PT=1 
*Quarterly export price index data for Slovenia are not available, therefore we introduce 
assumption that the pass-through is = 1 derived by Coricelli et al. (2003) and Zsolt (2001) 
Source: Our calculation on Datastream data. 
 
If none of the exchange rate changes is reflected in prices abroad, it is 
referred to as “no pass through”. Theoretical analyses list a number of 
factors underlying the pricing decisions taken by export firms following an 
appreciation (depreciation) of their currency. 
 
Let e be the nominal exchange rate, PF the foreign firm’s price level 
expressed in foreign currency terms, with the foreign currency price being 
PF/e, the phenomenon of pass through can be, therefore, expressed by 
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dPF/de. Alternatively, a more convenient way of expressing the pass through 
is by computing the price elasticity in the form (dPF/ de) (e / PF). In case the 
latter elasticity equals 1, the full pass through condition holds, while no pass 
through arises in case of (dPF/ de) (e / PF)= 0 . 
 
The phenomenon of pass-through is the result of a combination of multiple 
factors, such as the degree of competitiveness of the market, the degree of 
substitutability among products, the possibility of achieving economies of 
scale relative to foreign competitors and how permanent the exchange rate 
devaluation is perceived to be. Therefore, it is difficult to make empirical 
generalization or make inference about firms pricing behaviour merely 
based on the extent of the observed pass-through. 
 
In line with the scope of our work, we use a simple measure of exchange 
rate pass-through on export price based on correlation coefficients and 
average price elasticity to exchange rate (Table 7). 
 
According to both correlation coefficients and average elasticities, the firms 
pricing behaviour in Hungary, Poland and Slovenia in the period 1999-2002 
has been that of maintaining export prices in terms of their currency close to 
the pre-appreciation (depreciation) levels39. Lithuania is in a middle case 
with an average correlation between the export price index and the exchange 
rate against the euro of around 0.5. Czech and Slovak Republic, Estonia and 
Latvia firm’s export pricing policy, in the same period, appears not to have 
followed exchange rate movements40. 
 
As mentioned before, a devaluation in a country in which there is pass-
through and intra periphery trade lead on one side at the worsening of price 
competitiveness of main trade partners, on the other side at the improvement 
of their terms of trade. Therefore, under certain conditions, if one of these 
countries devaluates the others have no incentive in matching the 
devaluation. 
 
In the case of Estonia, Latvia and Slovak Republic, that seem to have a low 
pass-trough, if a devaluation arises, the intra periphery effect of beggar-thy-
neighbour, due to competition in EU, disappears. However there could be an 
other source of beggar-thy-neighbour, due to the decrease of export shares 
towards the devaluing country. This effect could worse the economic 
                                                          
39
 This firm policy in case of appreciation of the national currency against the euro implies 
a “skimming” pricing strategy while in case of depreciation a “penetration” or “market 
share” pricing strategy. See Sundaram and Mishra (1992). 
40 These results are in line with the studies of Coricelli, Jazbec and Masten (2003) and Zsolt 
(2001), according to which the point estimates of pass-through are higher in Slovenia and 
Hungary than in Poland, while the pass-through is low in the Czech Republic. 
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conditioned of trading partners in the periphery giving to them an incentive 
to match the devaluation.  
 
 
Concluding remarks 
In table 8 the values of similarity index and of pass-through are presented 
for each country pairs. The joint analysis of these indicators provides us 
with some indications concerning currency shocks transmission for each 
country pairs under exam.  
 
In the North West quadrant of the table- with a lower threshold, arbitrarily 
chosen, of the similarity index (70) and low degree of pass-through 
(between 0 and 0.2)- there are Slovak Republic, Latvia, Estonia and Czech 
Republic. These countries if a devaluation arises and there is intra periphery 
trade, should transmit with higher probability the currency disturbance to 
trading partners with similar trade structure. 
 
For example, if Slovak Republic devalues a devaluation could arise in 
Czech Republic. This probability is enhanced by the following factors: i) a 
relatively high degree of bilateral trade between the two countries (15.2%), 
ii) an high index of export similarity (94.7) and iii) of bilateral competition 
(0.8). 
 
Given that Slovak Republic has a pass through equal to 0, the beggar thy 
neighbour effect that incentives the transmission of currency shock is not 
due to a price competitive effect. The transmission mechanism occurs 
mainly through the bilateral trade links: Slovak Republic once devalued 
could reduce import demand from Czech Republic becoming Czech 
Republic goods more expensive in its currency. The impact of import 
demand switch off is the higher, the greater is the bilateral trade between the 
two countries and the higher is the similarity index between them.  
 
Interestingly, a feed back effect could arise between the two countries (see 
table 8). Also the Czech Republic has a low degree of pass-through, in fact 
it is in the same quadrant of the table. Thus implications similar to those for 
Slovak Republic hold if a devaluation originates in Czech Republic. 
 
In the North East quadrant of the table there are Poland, Hungary and 
Slovenia. If a devaluation arises They should transmit the shock through the 
channel of competition in the EU-15 market. A devaluation in Slovenia, 
which has a pass through of 1, could incentive a devaluation in Poland. The 
latter has a very high similarity index with respect to Slovenia indeed.  
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On the one side, Slovenia after devaluation will gain competitiveness 
causing loss of export shares for Poland in EU-15 market. On the other side, 
Poland would gain a positive terms of trade effect.  
 
Table II.8 CEECs currency shocks vulnerability 
(2002) 
       PT 
F.K 
0 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.9 1 
 Sk Lv Ee Cz Lt Pl Hu Sl 
95.3      Pl-Sl  Sl-Pl 
94.7 Sk-Cz   Cz-Sk     
93.4 Sk-Sl       Sl-Sk 
92.2 Sk-Pl     Pl-Sk   
91.2   Ee-Pl   Pl-Ee   
88.4   Ee-Sl Cz-Sl    Sl-Cz, 
Sl-Ee 
87.4    Cz-Pl  Pl-Cz   
85.3    Cz-Hu   Hu-Cz  
85.2 Sk-Ee  Ee-Sk      
80.7   Ee-Cz Cz-Ee     
80.4 Sk-Hu      Hu-Sk  
76.7      Pl-Hu Hu-Pl  
75.4   Ee-Lt  Lt-Ee    
74.5       Hu-Sl Sl-Hu 
71.2  Lv-Hu     Hu-Lv  
70.4   Ee-Hu    Hu-Ee  
         
68.8     Lt-Pl Pl-Lt   
68.6        Sl-Lt 
65.4 Sk-Lt    Lt-Sk    
66.6  Lv-Ee EE-Lv      
61.1    Cz-Lt Lt-Cz    
60.2  Lv-Pl    Pl-Lv   
59.1  Lv-Lt   Lt-Lv    
57.7  Lv-Sl      Sl-Lv 
53.6     Lt-Hu  Hu-Lt  
51.9 Sk-Lv Lv-Sk       
47.7  Lv-Cz  Cz-Lv     
PT= Pass-through; FK= Finger and Krenin Index. 
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The transmission of shocks is positively correlated to the degree of 
competition of country pairs in EU 15 and to the degree of similarity of 
export structures. On the contrary, bilateral trade between Slovenia and 
Poland would contain the contagion due to the terms of trade effect. 
 
It has to be noted that the bilateral trade between Poland and Slovenia is 
indeed very low (0.1%) This suggests that in this case the price 
competitiveness effect could exceed the terms of trade effect, enhancing the 
possibility of currency disturbances transmission. According to the findings 
of previous paragraph (low intra periphery trade) this effect is likely for all 
country pairs in this quadrant. 
 
The remaining quadrants of the table represent intermediate situations and 
ambiguous results could be derived. Nevertheless the logic underlying in all 
quadrants the analysis is the same as in the North - East, North –West 
quadrants. 
 
To conclude, in this paragraph it is shown a general theoretically backed 
framework to interpret the role of trade variables in currency disturbances 
transmission mechanisms. Due to pass-through and trade structures 
heterogeneity, it is very difficult to derive a unitary policy implication on 
ERM II potential sustainability. However it is possible to single out for 
which country pairs the incentive to transmit currency shocks is higher. 
 
Our results point out that (other things being equal and given the contained 
intra periphery trade) the transmission of currency disturbances is lower if 
the disturbance origins in countries with low pass-through (Slovak and 
Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia), and higher if origins in countries with 
high pass-through (Poland, Hungary and Slovenia).  
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Chapter III 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regional arrangements and the pattern of trade flows in the 
enlarged European Union. A gravity model estimate for the 
Central Eastern European Countries. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The object of this chapter is to estimate the effect of European Union 
eastwards enlargement process on trade patterns in the Union. In particular, 
we intend to investigate whether and how the Free Trade agreements signed 
by CEECs41 have exerted a different impact on centre-periphery and intra-
periphery trade relationships. We also intend to evaluate if the perspective 
to join the EU has had anticipated, additional positive effects on exports 
flows coming from the eight CEE countries which joined the EU in May 
2004. 
 
Although the formal beginning of negotiations for eastward EU enlargement 
is more recent, the CEEC accession process somehow began in the early 
90s, therefore shortly after the free market system got under way. In fact, 
since then the acceding countries have been signing bilateral agreements 
with EU (i.e. the European Association Agreements) which have 
represented an advance in the path towards integration through stipulating a 
progressive liberalisation of trade. 
                                                          
41
 Note that both here and in the rest of the paper, the acronym CEECs is used to refer to the 
eight Central and Eastern European countries which joined the EU in  May 2004: Hungary, 
Poland, Czech and Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia 
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It is worth noticing that starting from 1992, Czech and Slovak Republic, 
Hungary and Poland have created the Central European Free Trade 
Agreement (CEFTA) and in 1996 Slovenia joined CEFTA as a full member. 
In 1994 also the Baltic Free Trade Agreement (BAFTA) entered into force. 
Furthermore, CEECs signed several bilateral trade agreements among 
themselves. 
 
We also intend to investigate if the progressive accession and integration of 
the CEECs with the EU and among themselves have involved non only 
increased trading with the former EU member countries but also a 
geographical restructuring of the trade flows across the European Union 
members (centre and periphery). 
 
The literature on trading bloc effects typically focuses on the Vinerian trade 
creation and trade diversion effects while the impact of economic 
integration and the creation of trading blocs on intra-bloc typically received 
minor attention. 
 
This paper analyses bilateral trade flows between eight CEECs and EU-23 
(EU-15 + CEECs, partner countries). We estimate a gravity equation using a 
system GMM dynamic panel data approach.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows. The first section surveys theory and 
empirics. The path towards integration through stipulating a progressive 
liberalisation of trade for CEECs is briefly analysed in section II. Section III 
describes the estimated equation, the empirical strategy and the data. Results 
are presented in section IV, conclusions follow. 
 
 
III.1 A review of the literature on regional integration in Eastern 
Europe 
In the last ten years, gravity models have also been broadly used in 
empirical studies of integration processes, in order to explore main changes 
in geographical trade pattern and to analyse the effects of regional and free 
trade agreements (RTA, FTA) and currency unions (CU) on trade flows.  
 
After the 1991, special attention in the gravity models literature has been 
given to estimate potential trade flows between EFTA, EU, CEECs and 
Baltic countries (Baldwin 1997; Gros and Gonciarz 1996, Brenton and Di 
Mauro 1999; Nilsson 2000, Lasser and Schrader 2002, Brenton and 
Manzocchi 2002).  
 
The most of the above mentioned papers find out that RTAs (European 
Agreements), that have been put in place to prepare transition countries for 
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accession to EU, have prompted substantial growth in EU-CEEC trade 
flows (i.e. regional dummies have positive and significant coefficients). 
Therefore most adjustment on trade flows has already occurred and the 
expected further effects of the completion of EU enlargement will be 
modest. 
 
In the empirical literature on EU Eastern enlargement, however, the study of 
geographical restructuring of the trade flows, due to the entry into force of 
RTAs and FTAs, among the former and the new members received a minor 
attention. 
 
Paas (2003) find that behaviour of bilateral trade flows within the countries 
involved in EU eastward enlargement accords to the normal rules of 
gravitation. He also finds that there are statistically significant spatial biases 
caused by the trade relationship between the Baltic Sea Region countries, 
the border countries and the EU member candidates countries. The East 
West trade relationships are still rather weakly developed and there is a 
statistically significant difference in international trade patterns between the 
two groups: Bilateral trade relations between the EU member and the 
CEECs are still less developed than trade relations between the former EU 
member. 
 
Martin and Turrion (2001) analyse the determinants of trade patterns 
between the CEECs and the OECD countries since the former began the 
processes of transition and opening up within the framework of the 
Association Agreements with the EU (EAs). To anticipate the trade impacts 
of their accession to the EU they estimate a gravity model for a set of 
countries formed by the EU members, the CEECs and the other members of 
the OECD (by way of a control area).The results confirm that the EAs have 
led to a preferential expansion of exchanges between the EU and CEECs. In 
fact, as regards regional dummies, they find that the increase in the export 
shares of CEECs in EU is sharper that the increase in those of third 
countries (the coefficient of dummies are 2.38 and 1.35 respectively). 
 
Laaser and Schrader (2002)’s gravity model estimates suggest in the 
specific case of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania that regional integration is 
much more intense than it is normally observed. According to the authors 
the role of distance (transport cost saving) for the Baltic countries is much 
more important in shaping their regional trade pattern than the institutional 
integration into the EU via the EAs. Laaser and Schrader estimates show 
that the process of EU association was not determinant, despite the 
expectation that the trade agreements with EU would have fostered Baltic-
EU trade flows while regional determinants dominated. Hence they 
conclude that the process of European integration mainly runs via Baltic 
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countries neighbours and that the transport system dominates the trade 
regime by shaping trade flows in this region (the coefficient of distance is 
close to one in all the estimates). 
 
Damijan and Masten (2002) explores the time-dependent efficiency of free 
trade agreements (FTAs) in a panel framework using static and dynamic 
model specifications. It shows that trade liberalisation per se need time to 
become efficient. Using an illustrative case of rapid expansion of Slovenian 
imports from other CEECs being part of CEFTA in the period 1993-98 the 
paper demonstrates that tariff reductions become effective in the second to 
third year after enforcement of the FTA. Regarding the effect of CEFTA 
agreement the analysis revealed that to be part of CEFTA increased the 
exports of other CEECs towards Slovenia by 18.5%. 
 
 
III.2 EU enlargement and CEECs: The “pure trade” effects and the 
“EU membership factor” effects. 
At the end of the EU enlargement process, the new members will enter into 
the highest stage of economic integration in the EU: They will join 
Economic and Monetary Union, as “no opt out” clause is allowed for new 
entrants. In May 2004, the new members entered the EU on the level of the 
Single Market. A participation also in EMU since the beginning has been 
considered not possible giving that most of the acceding countries did not 
yet fulfil the convergence criteria provided by the Maastricht Treaty42.  
 
In the case of EU enlargement we have to deal with the standard effects of 
regional integration43, “pure trade” effects, plus a specific aspect: “EU 
membership factor” effects. 
 
“Pure trade” effects are the traditional trade effects of economic integration 
that occur through trade creation and trade diversion. Trade creation refers 
to increased trade generating new economic activity, whereas trade 
diversion refers to redirection of existing trade as result of changes in tariffs 
and other barriers due to regional custom union. “EU membership” effects 
are the positive effects exerted on trade and economic activity by the 
participation in European Single Market. 
 
                                                          
42 The ECOFIN Council of November 7, 2000 in its statement on the implications of the 
accession process upon exchange rate arrangements in the acceding countries identified 
three distinct stages for the full monetary integration of candidate countries (i) the pre-
accession stage (free choice of an exchange rate regime; (ii) the accession stage (new 
member states shall treat their exchange rate policy as “a matter of common interest” (EC 
treaty Art. 124); (iii) after accession the new member countries are expected to join the 
ERM II.  
43 Baldwin and Venables (1995). 
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III.2.1 The “pure trade” effects: the RTAs and the FTAs 
With respect to the “pure trade” effects it has to be noted that EU has 
concluded European Agreements (EAs) with CEECs during the 1990s. That 
implies that an asymmetric tariff reduction has taken place in trade between 
the EU and the CEECs. Since 1997, the EU has eliminated practically all 
tariffs (exceptions are agricultural and sensitive products) on imports from 
the CEECs. Having joined the EU in 2004, the CEECs entered into the 
customs union of the EU (Common External Tariff and Common 
Commercial Policy) and participated in the Single Market of the EU and 
border controls has been abolished.  
 
Tab.III.1 Free Trade Agreements 
 Date of entry into force 
 CMEA EU GSP CEFTA BAFTA OECD WTO EA 
C R. 1-1-49 1991 1-3-93  21-12-95 1-1-95 1-3-92 
E 1-1-49 1992  1-4-94  13-11-99 1-1-95 
H 1-1-49 1990 1-3-93  7-5-96 1-7-95 1-3-92 
LV 1-1-49 1992  1-4-94  10-2-99 1-1-95 
L 1-1-49 1992  1-4-94  31-5-01 1-1-95 
P 1-1-49 1990 1-3-93  22-11-96 1-7-95 1-3-92 
SR. 1-1-49 1991 1-3-93  14-12-00 1-1-95 1-3-92 
S  1980* 1-3-96   30-7-95 1-1-97 
CMEA: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, CEFTA: Central European Free Trade 
Area, BAFTA: Baltic Free Trade Agreement, EA: European Agreement. GSP: Generalised 
System of Preferences 
*Slovenia retained preferential status for its exports under the so-called autonomous trade 
preferences granted by the EU to Yugoslavia in the 1980 Cooperation Agreement 
Source: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm 
 
Although trade components of EAs with some CEECs went into effect on 
different dates ranging from 1992 (former Czechoslovakia, Hungary and 
Poland) to 1996 (Slovenia), schedules of elimination of duties and non 
tariffs barriers on industrial products had one important component in 
common. They all had January 1, 2002 as the date to complete the process 
of liberalization. 
 
EAs are bilateral agreements between EU and individual applicant countries 
(table 1). It should be emphasized that these agreements do not exist 
between applicant countries. The EAs thus could have led to the emergence 
of the so called “hub-and-spoke” pattern, creating trade between the EU and 
each applicant country separately, while discouraging trade among applicant 
countries.  
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Several CEECS have also signed free trade agreements among themselves 
(tables 1 and 2). The first preferential agreement among CEECs was 
CEFTA44, which entered into force in 1993. Its membership gradually 
expanded over time. Baltic states signed FTA among themselves in 1995 
(BAFTA).  
 
Tab.III.2 Intra-Periphery Free Trade bilateral Agreement 
 Date of entry into force 
 E H LV- L P S R 
Czech Rep. 12-Feb-98  1-Jul-97 1-Jul-97  1-Jan-93 
Estonia  1-Mar-01     
Hungary   1-Jan-00 1-Mar-00   
Latvia       
Lithuania       
Poland   1-Jun-99 1-Jan-97   
Slovak Rep. 12-Feb-98  1-Jul-97 1-Jul-97   
Slovenia 1-Jul-97  1-Aug-96 1-Mar-97   
Source: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm 
 
 
III.2.2 CEECs trade opening: Some stylised facts 
To examine some features of the process of trade opening up of CEECs, 
table 3 and 4 follow. They contain information on bilateral trade flows 
coming from CEECs directed towards the Centre (EU15) and the Periphery 
(CEECs). 
 
In short, the features found in the trading pattern of CEECs suggest that 
export share towards EU-15 was, in the first half of the 1990s, relatively 
high partly because reduction in trade barriers have already taken place.  
 
After the 1989, in fact, the EU granted GSP (Generalised System of 
Preference) status first to Hungary and Poland (1990), then to Bulgaria and 
former Czechoslovakia (1991), and subsequently to Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania (1992). Slovenia retained preferential status for its exports under 
the so-called autonomous trade preferences granted by the EU to 
Yugoslavia in the 1980 Cooperation Agreement (table 1). The GSP status 
                                                          
44 The CEFTA provides a framework for bilateral agreements among seven states. More 
precisely, the CEFTA system has two components: multilateral and bilateral. A multilateral 
component comprises commonly agreed preferences, whereas a bilateral one those 
negotiated bilaterally and not extended to all CEFTA members. 
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significantly improved access of exporters from CEECs to EU markets, 
especially, for industrial products45.  
 
Following the demise of central planning and the associated collapse of the 
CMEA, trade linkages among CEECs contracted dramatically and still 
remain very weak. The share of this trade increased between 1989 and 1993 
but mainly because of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia.  
 
Tab. III.3 Share of export to Former CPE** and EU 
 CPE** EU 
 1988 1992 1988 1992 
Czechoslovakia* 47.7 19.7 38.4 61.8 
Hungary 43.6 7.7 39.1 75.1 
Poland 35.7 15.7 49.2 62.3 
Estonia n.a. 29.2 n.a. 68.5 
Latvia n.a. 58 n.a. 38.5 
Lithuania n.a. 57.8 n.a. 39.1 
*Excludes intra Czech-Slovak trade,  
** CPE is defined as Federal Soviet Union (including Baltics), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland and Romania 
Source: Hoekman B., Djankov S. (1996) 
 
The bulk of intra-CEECs trade takes place between the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, which until 1992 had been part of the same national economy. 
Combined exports from Czech Republic and Slovakia to CEECs (table 4b) 
account for around two thirds of intra-CEECs exports46. 
 
The geographical redistribution of trade flows in the period 1993-2003, into 
the EU-23 seems to have been generally in favour of the Centre (EU-15). 
The only relative exceptions are Hungary, Poland and Slovenia (tab.4b). 
With respect to the world total, data show an increase in intra-periphery 
trade flows for all CEECs with the exception of Czech and Slovak Republic 
(tab.4a). 
 
It is a very difficult task to identify with any precision the extent to which 
preferential access to EU markets was responsible for reorientation in 
geographic patterns of trade of CEEC. Under central planning regime they 
undertraded with the EU and overtraded with each other and other members 
                                                          
45 GSP preferential rates embraced 63 percent of all CN tariff lines in EU imports with 
most of them (94 percent of GSP items) subject to zero rates. The interim trade component 
of EA overshadowed GSP arrangements by retaining preferential tariffs and making them 
permanent rather than subject to annual reviews (Kaminsky 2001). 
46
 Kaminsky 2001. 
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of the former CMEA47. A sizable portion of the adjustment can be 
attributable to the correction in earlier trends.  
 
 
Tab.III.4 Trade integration vs EU (% of World total) 
Table 4a 1993 2003 
  EU/W C/W P/W EU/W C/W P/W 
Czech Rep. 73 48 25 63 51 12 
Estonia* 39 30 09 81 67 14 
Hungary 35 34 1 66 60 6 
Latvia 43 33 10 83 67 16 
Lithuania 47 36 11 53 39 14 
Poland 71 67 4 77 66 11 
Slovak Rep. 79 28 51 65 46 19 
Slovenia 55 54 1 63 56 7 
 Trade integration vs EU(% of EU15+ CEECs) 
Table 4b 1993 2003 
  C/EU P/EU C/EU P/EU 
Czech Rep. 66 34 81 19 
Estonia* 64 36 83 17 
Hungary 97 3 92 8 
Latvia 76 24 81 19 
Lithuania 62 38 73 27 
Poland 94 6 86 14 
Slovak Rep. 36 64 71 29 
Slovenia 99 1 89 11 
*1994, EU= EU-15 + CEECs, C= Eu-15, P= CEECs 
Source: IMF DOTS 
 
 
While the shift from a supply-constrained economic regime to a demand-
constrained regime, combined with the collapse of import demand in 
CMEA, could have been the major force behind the expansion of CEECs-
EU trade. We assume that also the measures introduced by the EU to 
support transition and accelerate re-integration of CEECs into EU markets 
have also contributed to trade expansion. 
 
 
                                                          
47 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, (COMECON or MEA), international 
organization active between 1956 and 1991 for the coordination of economic policy among 
certain nations then under Communist domination, including Albania (after 1961), 
Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and 
the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia participated in matters of mutual interest. Although it was 
formed in 1949, a formal charter was not ratified until 1959. The charter gave COMECON 
the same international status as the European Economic Community (Common Market), 
but the structure was controlled by heads of state.  
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III.2.3 The “EU membership factor”  
Concerning the “EU membership factor” effects, we refer to the boost that 
trade receives through movements of factors of production and other 
dynamic effects such as capital accumulation, technology transfer, increased 
competition and exploitation of economies of scale.  
 
The EU membership, which also implies for these countries a commitment 
to a peg exchange rate (ERM II) and eventually to a single currency will 
likely change the international assessment of risk in these countries. The 
exchange rate stabilisation, the EU “seal of approval” and the 
macroeconomic stabilisation programmes that accompany accession are the 
source of standard returns from Centre-Periphery type integration to the 
Periphery. These usually included increased flows of trade as well as of 
direct and portfolio investment as investor face lower institutional and 
policy risks.  
 
Although it is too early to account for the post accession effects of the EU 
membership factor, it seems in some way reasonable to measure the 
“anticipated” effect of the “EU factor” on bilateral trade.  
 
In fact, although the formal accession was in May 2004 the process began in 
the early 1990s. At the European Council summit in Copenhagen (June 
1993), the EU invited the CEECs to enter the EU and formulated the three 
accession criteria (democracy, market economy and acquis 
communautaire). In late 1997, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia 
and Estonia started negotiation (the “Luxembourg group”); whereas the 
other CEECs started in 1999 (the “Helsinki group”). Eventually, at the 
European Council of Laeken (December 2001) the Council agreed with the 
European Commission Report that all candidates, with the exception of 
Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, were suitable to join the European Union. 
 
We intend to test which role, if there is any, had the pure trade and EU 
membership effects on bilateral flows between CEECs and former EU 
countries. 
 
 
III.3 Equation, empirical strategy and data description 
We introduce three sets of variables: i) gravity variables, ii) controls for 
heterogeneity  iii) controls for dynamics. Dummy variables to test the 
effects of FTAs on bilateral trade flows between CEECs and EU 22 (the 
importer countries) are also introduced in the estimates. 
 
i) Standard gravity variables. Bilateral distance as a proxy of transport costs 
and importer and exporter’s GDP as proxies respectively of demand and 
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production factors. We add to this standard specification an index of relative 
country size, an index of absolute difference in relative factor 
endowments48 between trading partners and an exchange rate volatility 
index. 
 
ii) Controls for heterogeneity. Following Baltagi Egger and Pfaffermayr, 
(2003) we introduce fixed effects for importer and exporter countries. 
Differently from these authors, we don’t control also for country-pair effects 
(i.e. the interaction effect between exporter and importer country picking up 
unobserved characteristics of country-pair) because this kind of variables 
would include the impact of bilateral trade agreements that we want to 
control by specific dummies.  
 
Again, differently from Baltagi et al. (2003), we do not introduce interaction 
terms between exporter and importer countries and time(it and jt)49. 
Following Bun and Klaassen (2004), we introduce instead a set of country-
pair specific time trend the reason being that trade flows tend to grow over 
time.  
 
Although using panel data allows for time effect to correct for any residual 
trend common to all bilateral trade flows, trends may vary across country-
pairs. For instance, transportation costs depend on country-pair distance and 
the structure of trade; these elements varies between country-pairs. 
Transportation costs have decreased over time and this could have been 
increased bilateral trade flows; it is unlikely that standard (common) trend 
correction could completely avoid omitted trend variables bias.  
 
As Bun and Klaassen (2004) underline, this approach is more flexible in the 
cross-sectional dimension (ij) with respect to Baltagi, Egger and 
Pfaffermayr formulation: It allows the trade development over time to be 
driven by other than national factors (i.e. transportation costs). We impose 
linearity for trends (at the cost of restricting it and jt dimension) instead of 
allowing for unrestricted time variation (at the cost of restricting the ij 
dimension). Linear trends usually capture the most part of trending 
variables. The estimates are robust also when we generalized the linearity 
hypothesis by allowing for quadratic trends. 
 
Controlling for exporter, importer and bilateral time trend effect is possible 
to proxy the multilateral “trade resistance index” (see Anderson and van 
                                                          
48
 See Helpman and Krugman (1985) 
49
 This approach, allowing for each country to have a separate parameter for each time 
period when it is an exporter and another one when it is an importer, leads to a maximum 
flexibility in it and jt dimension of the panel: all possible nation-specific variables can 
move unrestrictedly over time. 
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Wincoop (2003)), obtaining a specification of gravity equation that can be 
interpreted as a reduced form of a model of trade with micro foundations50.  
 
iii) Controls for dynamics. It is worth to underline that when considering the 
time dimension, one should not forget that accession is a very recent 
phenomenon. 
 
Given the novelty of the phenomenon, traditional static gravity models, that 
generally deal with long-run relationships, are not well suited to interpreting 
the repercussions of the accession. For this purpose, we need to make the 
gravity equation more short-run oriented, by explicitly introducing 
dynamics, controlling for the lagged effects of the dependent variable and 
detecting the short term influences of the “forthcoming accession” and of all 
other variables affecting bilateral trade in EU enlarged. 
 
Indeed, the “short run” can generally be highly relevant in trade analyses, 
since countries that trade a lot with each other tend to keep on doing so. 
Such inertia mainly derives from the sunk costs exporters have to bear to set 
up distribution and service networks in the partner country, leading to the 
emergence of substantial entrance and exit barriers (see Eichengreen and 
Irwin, 1996). This sticky behaviour seems all the more important in the case 
of CEECs –EU 15, where trade relationships are affected not only by past 
investment in export-oriented infrastructures, but also by the accumulation 
of invisible assets such as political, cultural and geographical factors 
characterising the area and influencing the commercial transactions taking 
place within it. 
 
It is worth noticing that, notwithstanding the general importance of the 
“persistence effects”, quite a few studies, based on a panel estimation of 
gravity equations, have considered the possibility of controlling for them 
(Egger 2000, De Grauwe and Skudelny 2000, Bun and Klaassen 2002, De 
Nardis and Vicarelli 2003).  
 
The introduction of dynamics into a panel data model raises an econometric 
problem. If trade is a static process, the “within” estimator (fixed-effect 
estimator) is consistent for a finite time dimension T and a infinite number 
of country-pairs N. But if trade is a dynamic process, the estimate of a 
dynamic panel like our model (a static one with the lagged dependent 
                                                          
50
 Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) pointed out that trade between a pair of countries 
depends on their bilateral trade barriers with all trading partners: trade will be stronger for 
those countries with a relatively low trade barriers. Rose and van Wincoop (2001) 
approximate the multilateral trade resistance index using country-pair fixed effects. Ritschl 
and Wolf  (2003) and Estevadeordal et al. (2003) propose using country-group dummies; 
our approach follow this suggestion. 
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variable) is more difficult. The reason is that the transformation needed to 
eliminate the country-pair fixed effects produces a correlation between the 
lagged dependent variable and the transformed error term that (for a finite T 
and an infinite N) renders the least square estimator biased and inconsistent. 
 
There are alternative estimators with which to bypass this inconsistency 
problem. Arellano and Bond (1991), suggested to transform the model into 
first differences and run using the Hansen two-step GMM estimator. First 
differencing the equation removes the random effects that are independent 
and identically distributed among individuals, and produces an equation 
estimable by instrumental variables. 
 
As far as the gravity model, the proposed strategy is however not costless. 
On the one hand, first-differencing the equation removes fixed effects but 
also time invariant regressors that are in the specification. If those regressors 
are of interest, the loss of information implied can be of no second order. On 
the other hand, first-differenced GMM estimator performs poorly in terms 
of precision if it is applied to short panels (along the T dimension) including 
highly persistent time series (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Lagged levels of 
time series that have near unit root properties are in fact weak instruments 
for subsequent first-differences. Since bilateral exports between (old and 
new) industrialized countries are expected to change sluggishly, one might 
suspect that this would affect our estimates. 
 
Arellano and Bover (1995) describe how, if the original equations in levels 
were added to the system of first-differenced equations, additional moment 
conditions could be brought to bear to increase efficiency. They show how 
the two key properties of the first differencing transformation - eliminating 
the time-invariant individual effects while not introducing disturbances for 
periods earlier than period t-1 into the transformed error term – can be 
obtained using any alternative transformation (i.e. forward orthogonal 
deviations). 
 
Blundell and Bond (1998) articulated the necessary assumptions for this 
“system GMM" estimator more precisely and tested it with Monte Carlo 
simulations51.  
 
As far as we know, very few studies adopted this methodology in the 
context of a gravity approach52. 
 
The estimated equation is:  
 
                                                          
51 Bond (2002) is good introduction to these estimators and their use. 
52
 See for example De Benedictis and Vicarelli (2005). 
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Ln (Expijt) = b1ln(Expijt-n) + b2ln(GDPit) + b3ln(GDPjt) + b4(SIMILijt) + 
b5(ENDOWijt) +b6ln(Dist ij) + b7VOLijt +  b8 FTAPijt + b9 FTAEUijt + b10 Entrijt + 
b11 Luxijt + b12 Helsinkiijt+ b13 αi  + b14 βj  + b15(τijt) 
 
where: 
 
ln = the natural logarithm, i is the exporter country, j is the importer country 
and t is the year, n is a lag structure for the dependent variable; 
Expijt = the exports in value from country i to country j;  
GDPit = the gross domestic product of the exporter country. 
GDPjt =  the gross domestic product of the importer country;  
SIMILijt = similarity index of two’s trading partners GDP as measure of 
relative country size; it is build as: 
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ENDOWijt = the absolute difference in relative factor endowments between 
country-pairs; it is build as: 
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where POP is the population. 
 
VOLijt=is the exchange rate volatility between counties i and j at time t; it 
has been measured by the standard deviation of the first difference of 
monthly natural logarithm of the bilateral nominal exchange rate at the 
current year y. 
Distij= is the distance between country pairs. 
 
FTAPijt =is a dummy variable that assumes value 0 for the absence of free 
trade agreements or customs unions among Periphery countries, 1 (year of 
entry into force) if these agreements are present; 
FTAEUijt =is a dummy variable that assumes value 0 for the absence of free 
trade agreements or customs unions among Periphery and EU –15 countries, 
1 (year of entry into force) if these agreements are present;  
 
Entrijt = is a dummy variable embodying the “announcement effect” of the 
entrance of the eight new member countries in EU. This announcement is 
dated at the European Council of Laeken in December 2001. The dummy 
assumes value 1 since 2002 for all country pairs in the sample. 
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Luxijt = is a dummy variable embodying the “announcement of negotiations 
effect” for Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia. The 
dummy assumes value 1 for exports coming from each of these countries 0 
otherwise. 
Helsinkiijt = is a dummy variable embodying the “announcement of 
negotiations effect” for Latvia, Lithuania and Slovak Republic. The dummy 
assumes value 1 for export coming from each of these countries, 0 
otherwise. 
αi = exporter country dummy; it is a dummy that assumes value 1 if export 
flows come from exporter country i to each one of importer countries j, 0 
otherwise;  
βj = importer country dummy; it is a dummy that assumes value 1 if export 
flows come from each one of exporter countries i to importer country j, 0 
otherwise; 
τij t = bilateral trend variables.  
 
The sources of these variables are shown in table 5. 
 
Tabl. III.5 Source and definitions of variables 
variables source sample 
period 
Bilateral export 
flows 
(current price, US 
$ millions) 
Direction of trade statistics, International 
Monetary Fund 
1990-2003 
Free Trade 
Agreement 
European Commission and World Trade 
Organisation 
1990-2003 
GDP (current price 
millions US $) 
World Economic Outlook database, 
International Monetary Fund 
1990-2003 
Distance Paul Brenton and Francesca Di Mauro 
http://www.ceps.be  
1990-2003 
Population Queen database, Eurostat 1992-2003 
GDP per capita Queen database, Eurostat 1992-2003 
Exchange rate IFS FMI, and BCE 1992-2003 
 
 
We expect that bilateral export flows are positively influenced by: 
 
i) the lagged endogenous variable. We expect that countries trading a great 
deal each other would continue to do so, thus reflecting entrance and exit 
barriers due to sunk costs. 
ii) the real GDP of importer and exporter countries. In gravity models trade 
flows are positively influenced by the dimension of origin and destination 
countries proxied by GDP. 
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iii) The presence of bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements. These 
dummies proxied the pure trade effects and are expected to have a positive 
impact on trade flows. 
iv) The announcements of entry into the EU. These dummies proxied the 
“EU membership factor effects” and are expected to have a positive effect 
on trade flows. 
 
We also expect that bilateral export flows are negatively influenced by: 
 
i) distance. It is used as proxy for the transport costs and cultural proximity 
between two countries; 
ii) exchange rate volatility 
 
We have no a priori on the signs of: 
 
i) relative country size index and ii) differences of factor endowments index. 
A positive (negative) sign of the first index and a negative (positive) sign of 
the latter could support the hypothesis that bilateral flows are higher (lower) 
the more similar two countries are (in terms of size) and the more dissimilar 
they are in terms of relative factor endowments.  
 
 
III.4 Estimates results  
The equation has been estimated for the group of the eight CEECs as 
reporting countries and the EU 15 plus the 8 CEECs as trading partners.  
 
Table 6 reports results of the test53 and the estimates. AR(1) and AR(2) test 
show the consistency of the GMM estimator and the inconsistency of the 
OLS procedure. Hence, by introducing dynamics, the proper estimation 
method is the former one. Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions shows 
that the hypothesis that all moment restrictions are satisfied for dynamic 
specification is not rejected. 
 
Not all the regressors are statistically significant and show the expected 
sign; between coefficients of major interest, agreement dummy between 
intra-Periphery, Centre and Periphery, and Luxembourg dummy coefficients 
are statistically significant. Also the “announcement effect” dummy seem to 
play a role in explaining bilateral trade flows.  
                                                          
53 Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a test of the hypothesis of no second-order serial 
correlation in the disturbances of the first differenced equation. This is a necessary 
condition for the valid instrumentation. The Arellano-Bond test performed for our estimate 
confirms that the GMM estimator is consistent. A test for the hypothesis of no first order–
order serial correlation is also reported: the rejection of the null hypothesis (i.e. the 
presence of first-order serial correlation) indicates the inconsistency of the OLS estimator. 
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More in details: 
 
i) “Gravity standard” variables. It is confirmed an inverse relationship 
between exports and distance. Sign of exporter counties GDP is negative; 
big differences between CEEC8 countries GDP (that are all exporters in our 
estimate) and the group of importer countries has had a detrimental role in 
explaining trade bilateral flows. The positive sign of relative country size 
index and the negative one of relative factor endowment index, although the 
latter is statistically not significant, confirms that trade relationships are 
higher the more similar two countries are in terms of country size and 
smaller the more dissimilar two countries are in terms of relative factor 
endowments. This latter result seems to support Linder’s hypothesis, like in 
Baltagi et al. (2003). On the other hand, the positive sign of importer 
countries GDP is statistically significant.  
 
 
Tab.III.6 Estimate of bilateral exports coming from CEECs-8, (1993-2003) 
Num.obs= 
1712 
Num group=176 F (216,1495) 
= 441.46 
Prob>F=0.000 sample period 
1990-2003 
 Coeff.  Std. Err. t P>|t| 
Ln(expij) t-1 0.4455 0.088 5.03 0.000 
Ln(GDPit) -0.355 0.142 -2.50 0.013 
Ln(GDPjt) 0.195 0.087 2.23 0.026 
Ln(DISTij) -1.08 0.172 -6.30 0.000 
Ln(SIMILijt) 0.149 0.054 2.75 0.006 
ENDOWijt -0.047 0.063 -0.75 0.455 
VOLijt -0.06 0.075 -0.84 0.402 
FTAEUijt  0.105 0.064 1.63 0.103 
FTAPijt  0.135 0.062 2.16 0.031 
Entrijt 0.095 0.036 2.60 0.010 
Luxijt 0.095 0.052 1.84 0.066 
Helsijt 0.008 0.063 0.13 0.894 
αι Yes    
βj Yes    
τij t Yes    
Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) in first differences: z = -5.71 Pr>z = 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) in first differences: z = 0.08 Pr>z = 0.934 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions: chi2 (63) = 62.38 Prob> chi2 =0.498 
 
ii) The lagged dependent variable is statistically significant until a 1-
period lag; the magnitude of the “persistence effect” seems a little bit lower 
respect other findings  based on more integrated and developed group of 
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countries (see De Nardis and Vicarelli (2003), Bun and Klassen (2002)). 
This gap can be explained by the fact that CEEC8 are less integrated than 
i.e. EU15 and by the inclusion of bilateral time trend in the regression, 
capturing part of “persistence effect”. 
 
iii) “Pure trade” variables: FTA-Per, FTA-EU. Both these free trade 
agreements dummies are positive and statistically significant (t=2.2, t=1,6). 
The coefficient shows that being part of a free trade agreement with respect 
to the case of not being part increases bilateral trade by more than 14% with 
respect to intra-periphery agreements and by more than 11% with respect to 
EA’s on average54.  
 
iv) “EU membership” variables: EU membership, Luxembourg and 
Helsinki. Both Entrance and Luxemburg results positive and significant 
supporting the assumption of the existence of an anticipated effect on trade 
of participation in European Single Market. The magnitude of this effect 
seems to be relatively high. Differently the dummy Helsinky is not 
significant.  
 
 
Concluding remarks  
According to the findings of the previous paragraph the following results 
can be highlighted. 
 
For what concern the “pure trade effect”, Free Trade Agreements (FTA) 
matter in explaining bilateral export flows coming from CEECs: trade 
agreements dummies are positive and statistically significant.  
 
Being part of a FTA with EU15 countries (Eas) increased CEECs bilateral 
trade by more than 11%; intra-periphery agreements increased trade around 
14.% on average. The relatively lower impact on export flows of EAs than 
intra periphery FTA could be explained by the fact that, starting from the 
end of the eighties, trade between CEECs and EU 15 was already intense 
because reduction of trade barriers have already taken place. 
 
Moreover, the CMEA (and for a while after its collapse in 1991) the trade 
relations between the CEECs have been driven by no economic factors and 
underdeveloped. Therefore, it is reasonable that the introduction of FTAs 
                                                          
54 Since the parameter of the dummy FTA are respectively  0.135 and 0.105, the variation 
of trade induced by being part of a trade agreement (FTA=1) with respect to the case of not 
being part of any agreement (FTA=0), i.e. [(EXP being part of a trade agreement /EXP not 
being part of ay trade. agreement) -1]x100 is given, other things being equal, by 
[(e0.135x1/ e0.135x0) –1]x100=14.4% and [(e0.105x1/ e0.105x0) –1]x100=11.1% 
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and RTAs were able to restore and develop them also within a broader EU 
framework. 
 
It is worth to notice that estimates results seem to support the evidence 
coming from the data (see paragraph II). Starting from a very low level, the 
rate of growth of intra-periphery trade has been higher than core-periphery 
trade, ceteris paribus, because of an higher FTA impact. From this 
perspective, trade agreements between centre and periphery did not hamper 
trade relationship among periphery countries (no “hub and spoke” effect). 
 
For what concern the “EU membership factor”, the dummies Luxembourg 
and entrance are positive and significant suggesting that the trade flows 
coming from CEECs “embodied” in both cases the news of the future EU 
membership. However the attempt to estimate further the effect of the 
accession by mean of the introduction of exchange rate volatility in the 
estimates did not give any significant results.  
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Appendix I 
 
Forbes and Rigobon (1999): Heteroscedasticity in market returns and 
cross-market correlation estimates. 
 
Forbes and Rigobon (1999), to underline the bias in the correlation 
coefficient simplify the model presented in paragraph I.3.2 (Some 
econometric issues: Shift contagion or Interdependence?)  
 
They assume β=0 (no feedback between yt and xt) and zt=0 (no global 
exogeneous shocks). Given these assumptions the correlation coefficient is 
 
ρ
 =
VxVy
yx ),cov(
, 
 
let us assume that a crisis arises in the market of x we will have that 
Vxc>Vx , and 
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The authors show that the bias could be measured as follows:  
 
ρ
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where ρc is the correlation coefficient biased and ρ is the one unbiased. δ is 
the relative increase of the variance of xt. 
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Appendix II 
 
The Corsetti et al. model (1998): The baseline scenario 
 
The following analysis study the effects of an unanticipated devaluation by 
country A on country B. Throughout the analysis, the Centre is assumed to 
maintain its monetary stance unchanged. Country B may decide to devalue 
to country A’s devaluation55. 
 
1. The case of full pass-through 
The author in the baseline scenario assume that there is full pass-through. In 
this case when country A devalues its currency against the Centre EA (the 
nominal exchange rate of A with respect to C) increases. The price of A’s 
exports to the Centre falls below its competitor (PCA<PCB). If country B 
attempts to maintain its unilateral peg, the demand for the Periphery goods 
by the Centre falls exclusively on export from country A, and the demand of 
C for B’s goods drops to zero. 
 
Assuming that the law of one price holds the trade balance is  
 
EB PCC CBC= PBB CCB 
 
for given EB, PCC and PBB, the fall in exports CBC translates into a fall in 
imports CBC. 
 
Now, the optimal consumption allocation for the consumers in country B: 
 
MB= 2 PCB CBC= 2 EB PCC CBC 
 
Shows that, for given domestic prices money demand (M) move one-to-one 
with import. Thus to avoid a devaluation, monetary authorities in country B 
must contract MB as much as CBC falls. Since CBB= MB/ PBB, the monetary 
contraction implies a dramatic fall in domestic consumption and output. To 
sum up, an attempt by country B to maintain the peg entails a very large 
welfare cost: the country loses its export market and collapses under a 
process of rapid demonetisation of the economy56. 
                                                          
55
 Throughout the model, the superscripts of consumption indexes denote the country of the 
consumer and the subscripts denote the country of the producer. 
56
 It is worth emphasizing that these corner solutions for the real and monetary equilibrium 
of country B are the consequence of the original assumption that goods of country A and B 
are perfectly substitutable from the vantage point of country C consumers. Relaxing such 
assumption leads to less extreme consequences without modifying the key message of the 
model. 
 74 
Conversely, the demand of imports from the Periphery goods by the Center 
country increases after a devaluation by A. Namely since: 
 
CCB = MC/2PCP= MCEA/2PAA 
 
the Centre’s optimal consumption of Periphery goods rises at the same rate 
as EA. With producers in b being driven out of the market, country A 
therefore experiences a record increase of its exports to the Centre, equal to  
 
∆CCA= CCB+∆CCP. 
 
Despite the adverse movements of the terms of trade, such an export boom 
allows the residents in A to increase their consumption of the Centre goods 
CAC. To show this, we rewrite the trade balance condition as: 
 
CAC= (PAA/ PCC)*(CCP/EA)*(CCA/CCP) 
 
and compare the equilibrium outcomes before and after country’s A 
devaluation. Recalling that prices are sticky in the seller’s currency and that 
the increase in the Centre’s import from the Periphery is proportional to the 
changes in EA, the increase of country A’s consumption of the Centre’s good 
is equal to: 
 
∆CAC =(∆CCA/ CCA - ∆CCP/ CCP)* CAC=(1+ ∆ΕA/ ΕA)* CAC 
 
Consumption of the Centre goods in country A more than doubles. Using 
this result together with the equilibrium conditions for country A’s agents 
the authors see that, in equilibrium, the growth rate of money supply MA 
exceeds the devaluation rate. Given PAA , this implies that consumption of 
local goods CAA must increase as well. 
 
Since the Centre country is assumed to keep its money supply fixed, the 
consumption of domestically produced goods CCC does not change vis-à-vis 
the increasing import form the Periphery. Nonetheless, production of the 
domestic good YC must now rise to match rise to match the higher external 
demand. 
 
The consequences of the devaluation in country A are summarised in table 
1. The subscript PEG means that all the effects are contingent on country B 
patenting to maintain the PEG. 
 
The defense of the fixed exchange rate forces  the monetary authorities of 
country B to lean against a vital adjustment in relative prices, and imposes a 
sharp contraction in domestic economic activity, consumption and welfare. 
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Table 1 The model under the PEG regime 
CAAPEG↑ CACPEG↑ YAPEG↑ 
CBB PEG↓ CBCPEG↓ YBPEG↓ 
CCA PEG↑   CCB PEG↓ 
               ↑ 
CCCPEG= YCPEG↑ 
 
 
Country B suffers a loss in cost-competitiveness and, as consequence of the 
domestic liquidity crunch, the demand for  country B’s products collapses. 
Country A’s devaluation is unambiguously beggar-thy-neighbor. 
 
The scenario changes radically if country B decides to follow country A in 
devaluing its currency. By doing so, country B is able to restore its lost 
competitiveness and prevent the plunge in the level of economic activity and 
consumption. The resulting pattern of macroeconomic effects in the world 
economy is summarised in table 2, where DEV indexes the levels of the 
variables contingent on country B’s devaluation. 
 
Table 2 The model under the DEV regime 
CAADEV↑ CACDEV= YADEV↑ 
CBB DEV↑ CBCDEV= YBDEV↑ 
CCA DEV↑      CCB DEV↑ 
                ↑ 
CCCDEV= YCDEV= 
 
 
When the authors include the assumption of intra periphery trade and of 
perfect substitutability among periphery goods results change. With these 
two assumptions the cost competitiveness effect of a devaluation by A 
(hitting producers in B) coexists with a terms of trade effect (favouring 
consumers in B). Therefore direct intra-periphery trade makes the overall 
impact of a devaluation by country A potentially ambiguous57. 
 
 
2. The case of no pass-through 
The authors revisit the analysis for the case in which prices are 
predetermined in terms of buyer’s currency and thus there is no pass-
through. Under such an assumption, the model simplifies significantly 
relative to the baseline scenario. From the money market equilibrium 
conditions the authors see that aggregate consumption moves in parallel to 
the money supply: 
Ci∝ Mi       i= A, B, C 
                                                          
57
 To inspect further  these issues the authors introduced a full-fledged intertemporal model 
which allows for intra-periphery trade, asymmetries in country size and finite elasticity of 
substitution among Periphery goods in the Center market. Such a framework will allow to 
analyze in detail the different roles played by bilateral trade vs. trade in third country in 
transmitting beggar-thy-neighbour policy shocks. 
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where ∝ denotes proportional to. In addition, any change in the level of 
consumption is evenly spread across all goods, as there are no changes in 
the relative prices faced by consumers: 
 
Cij∝ Ci  j= A, B, C 
 
In the Centre country, because of a fixed money supply MC, the 
consumption of domestically produced and imported goods is not affected 
by devaluations in the Periphery. Thus, the balanced trade conditions imply: 
 
CAC ∝ EA  , CBC ∝ EB 
 
In other words, for a Periphery country, a devaluation raises the revenue 
from exports in domestic currency. After a devaluation, domestic consumer 
can afford to consume more of all goods. Both exchange rates and 
consumption move together with the stock of money supply with unit 
elasticity. 
 
So when A devalues, in presence of intra-periphery trade, the consumption 
gains accrue exclusively to A because of the increase in the real value of its 
export revenues, while the cost of devaluation in terms of increased labour 
effort are spread worldwide. Country A’s devaluation is beggar-thy 
neighbour as it reduces revenues and profits of producers abroad. 
 
The non-devaluing countries whose export revenues fall are required to 
work more to sustain the initial level of consumption. The conclusion are 
more striking the optimal response for country B is always to devalue. 
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